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1 Introduction
Labor adjustment costs – such as recruiting costs, costs of screening and training new employees, lay-
off notice periods, and mandated severance pay – play a prominent role in determining both the timing
and the extent of employment variation in response to shocks. As these costs distort firms’s employment
decisions, they can be detrimental to the reallocation of labor resources from less to more productive
firms, and to economic growth in general.1 Yet, in the short run, firms can respond to productivity fluctu-
ations by varying labor utilization. The fact that firms use the hours margin of adjustment has long been
recognized by policymakers, a recent example of it being the short-time working scheme (Kurzarbeit)
introduced by Germany in the latest recession.2 However, standard economic models that are used to for-
malize and assess the impact of labor adjustment costs only allow firms to change the number of workers
they employ (the extensive margin) and not the amount that each worker works (the intensive margin).
This paper relaxes that assumption and proposes a dynamic model, which includes both margins of ad-
justment, and subsequently tests the model using firm-level data.
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium search model with joint dynamics of the number of
workers and hours per worker. The driving force of the model is idiosyncratic profitability shocks, which
firms can accommodate by changing the work hours of their existing employees, instead of (or jointly
with) varying the size of their labor force. Hours of work and compensation in the model are determined
through a bargaining process using a Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining protocol. The presence of
frictions in the labor market means that matching workers with vacant jobs takes time and uses resources.
On the other hand, raising hours can be done immediately, although at a cost of higher wages. Hence, the
firm faces a trade-off between these two channels of adjustment.
In addition, I allow for endogenous and stochastic quits by incorporating on-the-job search into the
model. Job-to-job transitions generate different vacancy filling and attrition rates across firms, alleviating
the impact of search frictions on the firm’s labor demand. In this setup, not only does each firm posts more
vacancies in the event of a positive shock, it also finds it easier to fill its vacancies and to keep its current
employees. Existing studies on labor adjustment costs typically assume constant quit rates, and thus
make no distinction between net and gross employment changes. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests
that, by focusing on net employment growth, we disregard a substantial worker turnover at the firm level
(see for instance Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2001) and Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006)).
There is a by-now extensive literature on the effect of adjustment costs on labor demand (see Hamer-
mesh and Pfann (1996) for a comprehensive survey).3 Most of these papers are based on partial equi-
librium models that solve for the optimal labor demand strategy of a firm in isolation from decisions of
workers or other firms. In contrast, the search model in this paper accounts for interactions between firms
and workers. For example, an increase in hiring costs induces firms to post fewer vacancies, thus creating
1More than half of aggregate productivity growth in the US appears to be driven by reallocation (see for instance Foster, Halti-
wanger and Krizan (2006)).
2Kurzarbeit scheme has been considered key to why Germany had a relatively low unemployment rate in the latest recession.
Under this scheme, employers can cut work hours of their employees thus avoiding layoffs, while the government covers most
of the resulting shortfall in the workers’ earnings. Not only does this program allow employers to reduce their labor costs in the
downturn, it also ensures that firms have their experienced workforce on hand when the economy recovers, thus saving on hiring
and recruiting costs.
3The literature on labor adjustment costs is also closely related to the investment literature (see among others Caballero and
Engel (1991; 1992)) and studies on factor demand in general (see Nadiri and Rosen (1973)). Bond and Van Reenen (2007) survey
econometric research on adjustment processes for both capital and labor using micro data. Previous research that accounts for labor
utilization in the adjustment cost models includes Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) and Cooper and Willis (2009).
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a positive externality on other firms by reducing congestion in the market. That in turn mitigates the effect
of the rise in hiring costs on aggregate employment. I show that this feedback mechanism turns out to be
very important when trying to assess the importance of adjustment costs for employment.
This paper uses a unique matched employer-employee panel of Danish administrative firm data that
provides high-frequency detailed information on employment changes and work hours of the firm’s em-
ployees. Based on these data, I show that firms use variation in hours to mitigate changes in the number
of workers. In particular, the growth rate of hours per worker and employment growth are negatively
correlated at the firm level; while lagged changes in hours are positively correlated with changes in em-
ployment. An adjustment cost model provides a natural framework for explaining these empirical facts.
The intuition is as follows: Suppose that it takes time to hire a new worker. Then, in the event of a positive
shock to the firm’s profitability, the firm raises average hours of work instantaneously, while adjustment
in employment is sluggish. As the firm’s labor force builds up to its new desired level, average work
hours fall. Hence, growth in hours and employment are inversely related.
The model is calibrated to fit the Danish firm data and is successful in capturing the overall features
of the data. Under the decreasing returns to scale assumption, the model generates an endogenous firm
size distribution that mimics closely the empirical distribution. It matches rich patterns of labor dynamics
at the firm level, including average hiring and separation rates, job creation and job destruction, as well
as the distribution of firms by net employment growth. On-the-job search is a crucial component that
enables the model to capture the data characteristics related to worker and job flows. Finally, the model
is capable of generating the negative correlation between the growth rates of employment and hours per
worker.
Given the calibrated parameter values, I find that the average cost of hiring a new worker is roughly
equal to one week of average wages. This value is low compared to the estimates found for other Eu-
ropean countries (see among others Rota (2004), Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001), and Kramarz and
Michaud (2004)), reflecting the fact that the Danish labor market is very mobile, with worker flow rates
averaging around 8% per month. In the numerical simulation, I show that doubled vacancy posting costs
raise the unemployment rate from 4.8% to 7.5% and reduce the job-finding rate by about 4 percentage
points. Moreover, firms substitute towards the intensive margin increasing average hours of work. I
perform the same experiment in a partial equilibrium framework and show that doubling the cost pa-
rameters, while keeping the vacancy-filling rates and the quit rates at the same level as in the benchmark
case, leads to twice the increase in unemployment. This finding suggests that using partial equilibrium
models to evaluate the impact of adjustment costs significantly overestimates their effect on aggregate
employment.
Finally, I use the model to simulate two types of policy experiments aimed at fostering job creation:
(i) introducing a hiring subsidy, similar to the US Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act
initiated in May 2010, and (ii) imposing an upper limit on the work hours, an example of which was
implemented in France in 2000 when the official workweek was reduced from 39 to 35 hours. A hiring
subsidy (in the amount of 30 to 70 percent of the average hiring costs) reduces unemployment, though
quantitatively the effect is small. The introduction of a shorter workweek, on the other hand, impacts
unemployment to a much greater extent. Even though this policy reduces unemployment at the expense
of a loss in total welfare due to the inefficient work hours choice, the welfare loss is quantitatively small,
thus favoring the introduction of a maximum hours limit over a hiring subsidy.
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In many aspects of the methodology, this paper is linked to standard random search models (see for
instance Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) and more recent work that introduces a theory of multi-worker
firms into search models (see for instance Coles and Mortensen (2012), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010),
and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013)).4 The closest paper to this work is Cooper, Haltiwanger and
Willis (2007), which examines variation in hours, employment, and vacancies based on micro and macro
data. My model differs from theirs by introducing endogenous quits and using a bargaining process to
determine hours and compensation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on employment and hours ad-
justment using Danish firm data. Section 3 introduces and describes the model. Section 4 shows the
calibration of the model and its fit to the data. Section 5 proceeds to demonstrate the impact of changes in
adjustment costs on the unemployment rate and the job-finding rate. It then compares the effects of the
two labor market policies on unemployment. Section 6 summarizes the findings and outlines directions
for future work. The appendix provides details on the data sources used in this paper, as well as on the
numerical simulation procedure.
2 Data
A labor adjustment model predicts that firms would eventually adjust their employment to its optimal
level after a sufficient period of time; therefore, the trade-off between the number of workers and average
work hours exists primarily in the short run. In order to investigate this relationship, we need to observe
changes in firm-level hours and employment on a fairly frequent basis. The empirical analysis in this
paper is based on a matched employer-employee panel of Danish firms over the period of 1999-2006 (a
full description is contained in Appendix A). The dataset contain information on firm-level employment
at a monthly basis. Moreover, high-quality longitudinal links enable me to construct monthly hires and
separations for each firm.
A work hours series is constructed using data on firms’ mandatory pension contributions that are
collected on a quarterly basis. In Denmark, firms are required to pay pension contributions for each
employee according to her weekly hours of work: (i) zero contribution is paid if working less than 9
hours a week; (ii) one third is paid if working between 9 and 18 hours; (iii) two thirds are paid if working
between 18 and 27 hours; and (iv) the full amount is paid for all employees working more than 27 hours
a week. Each firm reports the sum of its total contributions over a quarter. Given this step function, I
construct a lower bound measure of total hours at the firm level by taking the left boundary of each 9-hour
interval. Then, combining it with the data on employment for a given firm, I compute a quarterly hours
per worker series. Hence, the empirical moments below refer to the lower bound measure of average
hours, unless stated otherwise.5
It is important to bear in mind that this measure of labor utilization may mask some of the variation
in actual hours. We only observe changes in per-worker hours if an employee moves to a different 9-
hour interval. Thus, for instance, if some of a firm’s part-time workers start working full time then the
4Kaas and Kircher (2011) develop a multi-worker firms model within a competitive search framework that has many similar
implications for employment growth at the firm level.
5Alternatively, I have constructed an upper bound measure of work hours. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion on the
construction of both of these variables. The two measures lead to very similar results for most of the empirical relations presented
in this paper, with the exception of the wage-hours relationship, which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
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increase in work hours will be reflected in the data. How well the lower bound measure on hours per
worker reflects actual labor utilization can be tested at the annual level using an alternative data source
that contains information on actual paid (regular and overtime) work hours for a sample of firms. Figure
1 below compares the annual growth rates of two hours per worker series: the first measure is derived
from the pension contributions as described above; while the second measure is the average weekly work
hours that are computed by dividing the total amount of hours by the number of employee-weeks in a
given year. In general, the two variables move closely together for growth regions below 50% in absolute
value.
Figure 1: The relationship between the growth rates of actual and lower bound work hours.
Note: Estimates are based on a uniform kernel with a bandwidth of 0.05. Shaded areas are 90% pointwise
bootstrap confidence intervals (clustered by firm ID). Source: Author’s calculations based on the Danish
firm data, 2002 - 2006. Sample contains all private firms with more than 10 full-time employees, with the
exception of agriculture and fishery.
In addition to work hours and employment records, the data contain information on quarterly payroll
costs for each firm over the period of 1999-2006 and purchases and sales records for all VAT-liable busi-
nesses over the period of 2002-2006. Wages and value added are measured in Danish Kroner (DKK) and
are deflated using a quarterly CPI with 2001 Q1=100. Combining these data with the employment and
hours series, I construct hourly wage and labor productivity variables. The empirical analysis is restricted
to firms in the private sector.
2.1 Hours and employment
Reallocation of labor from less to more productive firms may well account for a large fraction of both
the level and growth rate in aggregate productivity (see among others Foster et al. (2006) for US data
and Lentz and Mortensen (2008) for Danish data). The idea of such growth-enhancing reallocation relies
on the assumption of the existence of labor market frictions that hinder employment adjustment. Two
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key questions that this paper addresses are (i) what is the extent to which firms vary work hours of their
employees, and (ii) is the observed dynamic interaction between hours and employment consistent with
the model of adjustment costs?
I start by looking at the extent of labor reallocation across firms with different productivity. Table 1
contrasts firms across the five quintiles of the productivity distribution in terms of their output and use of
labor inputs. More productive firms increase their use of labor resources by both hiring more employees
and raising average work hours. Given diminishing returns to labor, more intensive use of labor inputs
leads to lower (and eventually negative) future growth rates of productivity. For instance, firms in the top
quintile increase their workforce by 4% and their total labor input by 8%; whereas their labor productivity
falls by 27%. Firms in the bottom quintile, on the contrary, lose 2.4% of their workers and reduce their
total labor resources by 14%, at the same time experiencing a 37% increase in their labor productivity and
a 23% increase in output. Overall, the reallocation of labor input is associated with productivity growth
and is more prominent when we look at the changes in total labor input as opposed to the changes in the
number of workers only.
Table 1: Reallocation of labor resources across firms, by quintiles of the productivity distribution.
Productivity distribution quintiles
1 2 3 4 5
Productivity growth, % 37.2 6.0 -1.4 -8.5 -27.3
Output growth, % 23.1 -3.7 -9.3 -13.1 -21.0
Employment growth, % -2.4 -1.0 0.1 1.4 3.7
Hours growth, % -14.1 -9.5 -7.7 -4.0 7.7
Notes: Quintile 1 is the lowest productivity and quintile 5 is the highest. For each year, all variables are
computed for firms in a given quintile in that year, then averaged over the period of 2002-2005. Yearly
growth rates are expressed as the first differences of log variables. Labor productivity is measured as
value added per hour measured based on the pension contributions data. Source: Author’s tabulations
from the Danish VAT statistics data, 2002-2006.
In the short run, because firms cannot easily change the number of workers they employ, the hours
margin becomes even more important. Table 2 presents summary statistics on the cross-sectional varia-
tion in the quarterly growth rates of hours per worker and employment, and the relationship between
them. First, firms exhibit a significant variation in employment growth. Less than 30% of Danish firms
employ the same number of workers in any two consecutive quarters. Much lower magnitudes of em-
ployment changes have been reported in empirical studies that look at other European countries. Varejao
and Portugal (2007), for instance, find that employment remains unaltered over the course of a quarter
for 74.7% of the establishments in a representative sample of Portuguese firms. This finding suggests that
the Danish labor market, in contrast to other European countries (especially in continental Europe), is
characterized by relatively low adjustment costs.
The second observation is that the standard deviation of hours and employment growth is about the
same, suggesting that firms use both the intensive and extensive margins to make adjustments to their
labor input. This fact is at odds with the widely known finding in the business cycles literature that hours
per workers are mildly procyclical and vary much less than employment in the aggregate data (see, for
instance, Cooper et al. (2007)). However, in a recent paper Ohanian and Raffo (2011) claim that this result
is characteristic of the US data but need not necessarily hold true for other countries. In fact, they show
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Table 2: Variation in the firm-level growth rates of hours per worker and employment.
Employment
Employment share-weighted,
Non-weighted share-weighted no time effects
Std. dev(∆ log Nt) 0.277 0.237 0.236
Std. dev(∆ log ht) 0.285 0.232 0.231
Corr(∆ log Nt,∆ log ht) -0.300 -0.427 -0.432
Corr(∆ log Nt,∆ log ht−1) 0.088 0.101 0.108
Source: Author’s tabulations from the Danish firm data, 1999-2006.
that in many OECD countries changes in the average hours per worker are about as large as changes in
employment also in the aggregate data.
Finally, Table 2 shows that there is a negative association between hours and employment growth rates
at the firm level. This empirical finding supports the existence of labor adjustment costs. Consider the
following example. Suppose that hiring is impeded by search frictions and the firm is hit by a positive
profitability shock. In response to a shock, the average work hours overshoot their optimal level and start
falling as the firm’s labor force builds up to its new desired level. Hence, hours per worker and employ-
ment move in opposite directions. Likewise, a negative shock in combination with an advanced layoff
notice period produces an immediate hours response and a more sluggish employment drop, thus gener-
ating a negative co-movement between these two variables. Figure 2 shows a non-parametric regression
of hours growth on workforce growth.6 The hours-employment growth relationship is monotone and the
negative correlation between the two series is observed for virtually all values of employment growth.
Moreover, changes in hours lead changes in employment: the relationship between employment growth
this period and hours growth previous period is positive.
Next, I examine the correlation coefficient between hours and employment growth by broad industry
groups. The hours-employment relationship is found to be weaker in Hotels and Restaurants, Fishing and
Construction sectors. These industries are associated with relatively low-skilled labor and presumably
lower adjustment costs and hence most of the adjustment is done on the workers margin. On the other
hand, Real Estate and Business Activities and Transport and Telecommunication demonstrate a stronger
association between growth rates of hours and employment. This evidence is again consistent with the
labor adjustment costs hypothesis.
2.2 Job and worker flows
Most of the existing models that are used to assess the effect of labor adjustment costs on employment
dynamics focus on net employment changes. Consequently, they do not distinguish between firms hiring
new workers or devoting more resources to keep their existing employees. Yet, these two employment
policies have different implications in terms of recruiting and training costs. Similarly, whether a reduc-
tion in the firm’s workforce is achieved through quits or layoffs, and therefore whether the firm incurs
dismissal costs or not, will have a different impact on its optimal employment decision. In this subsection,
6Non-parametric regressions in this paper are based on Nadaraya-Watson estimator and confidence intervals are obtained by
bootstrapping (see Simonoff (1996) for theory and applications of kernel-based regressions and Horowitz (1997) for bootstrapping
methods).
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Figure 2: Non-parametric regression of hours growth on employment growth
Note: Estimates are based on Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Shaded areas are 90% pointwise
bootstrap confidence intervals (clustered by firm ID). Source: Author’s calculations based on the Danish
firm data, 1999-2006.
I examine firm-level monthly employment growth patterns in detail, distinguishing explicitly between net
and gross employment changes.
Here, I follow the existing literature in constructing and analyzing job flows and worker flows (see for
instance Davis et al. (2006), Burgess et al. (2001) and the references therein). Using the matched employer-
employee structure of the dataset, I construct monthly hires as the number of individuals that are working
in a given firm during month t and not during month t − 1. Separation flows are equal to the number
of workers that are employed in a given firm during month t− 1 and not during month t. Job flows are
defined as the number of jobs created in growing firms (job creation) and the number of jobs destroyed
in contracting firms (job destruction) within month t. The corresponding rates are expressed in flows
divided by the average employment in month t and t − 1. This procedure yields growth rates in the
interval [−2, 2] with endpoints corresponding to births and deaths (for more details on the properties of
this rate measure see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)).
The data at hand indicate that there is a fair amount of job and worker mobility in the Danish labor
market (see Table 3). Monthly hiring and separation rates average about 9% of employment. Job de-
struction and job creation rates are about 5-6% of employment (4% for continuing firms), more than twice
the rates in the US labor market (see Davis et al. (2006)). That is, one of every 20 jobs on average gets
destroyed every month.
To highlight the difference between job flows and worker flows, I construct a worker churning rate,
defined as the sum of the hiring and separation rates less the absolute value of the net growth rate in
employment (see Burgess et al. (2001) for more details on this measure). The churning rate refers to
worker flows in excess of job flows and it is quite high in the Danish labor market, averaging 7.5% per
month. The fact that firms churn workers indicates that contracting businesses still hire workers and
workers leave growing firms. On average over the period of 1999-2006, job creation constitutes 32.2% of
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all (size-weighted) hires; while 30.6% of all separations are associated with job destruction.
Table 3: Average monthly job flow and worker flow rates
Employment
Non- Employment share-weighted,
weighted share-weighted continuing firms
Hires 0.180 0.097 0.078
Separations 0.152 0.091 0.076
Job Creation 0.158 0.061 0.041
Job Destruction 0.129 0.054 0.039
Net employment change 0.029 0.006 0.002
Churning 0.046 0.074 0.075
Note: Sample includes all private firms and contains more than 10 million firm-month observations.
Source: Author’s tabulations from the Danish firm data, 1999-2006.
To sum up, the empirical evidence presented in this section shows that firms vary their labor input
on both the extensive and intensive margin. First, the standard deviation of the growth rates in employ-
ment and hours per worker are about the same. Second, the movements in hours and employment are
inversely related, which is consistent with the idea of adjustment costs causing a fast response of hours to
demand shocks and a more sluggish response of employment. Furthermore, hours growth seems to lead
employment growth. Finally, I also show that worker flows and job flows are quite distinct. In fact, only
about 30% of monthly hires and separations arise in connection with job creation and job destruction, re-
spectively. Different implications of net and gross employment changes in terms of adjustment costs call
for a theory that explicitly models hiring and separation decisions of firms. The next section builds up a
labor adjustment model that incorporates the empirical facts outlined above.
3 Model
The model is a continuous time matching model of multi-worker firms with heterogenous profitability.
I proceed in four steps. I start with an overview and the primitives of the model. Secondly, I show
how work hours and wages are determined within each period as a result of bargaining between a firm
and its workers. Thirdly, I look at the optimal employment policies of workers and firms in a dynamic
context. The employment path within the firm depends on both the firm’s and its workers’ decisions: the
worker’s problem determines the quit rate to unemployment and the rate of job-to-job transitions, while
the firm’s problem defines optimal hiring and firing decisions. Fourthly, I derive steady state conditions
for aggregate variables and the distribution of firms across productivity-size types.
3.1 Setup
A final good Y is produced by a continuum of intermediate inputs x and is sold by many suppliers
in a competitive output market at price P. Let the final good to be determined by the (Dixit-Stiglitz) CES
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production function:
Y =
[∫ K
0
x(j)
ρ−1
ρ dj
] ρ
ρ−1
, ρ > 0,
where x(j) is the quantity of product j, ρ represents the elasticity of substitution between any two in-
termediate goods, and K is the total measure of inputs available. The final good is produced by many
competitive suppliers; therefore, a profit-maximizing amount of each input is given by
x(j) =
(
P
p(j)
)ρ
Y, j ∈ K, (1)
where P is the price of the final good, and p(j) is the price of input j. The zero-profit condition for final
good producers implies that the aggregate price index is derived as
P =
[∫ K
0
p(j)1−ρdj
] 1
1−ρ
.
The intermediate good is produced using a linear technology, i.e.
x = qhn, (2)
where x is the number of units supplied, q is firm’s productivity, and hn is total labor input, the product
of the number of workers n and the average work hours h. Let the final good be a numeraire with P = 1.
Firms differ in their productivity level q, which at any given point in time is subject to a shock that
arrives at Poisson rate µ. In the event of a shock, a new productivity level is drawn from distribution
Φ(·), independently of the current productivity level. The corresponding density function is denoted by
φ(·) and is defined on a support [q, q]. Existing firms are subject to the exogenous destruction risk and die
at rate δ. At the same time, there is a measure one of potential entrants that generate a new product and
enter the market at rate η.
Firms and workers are brought together pairwise through a sequential and random matching process.
To recruit, firms post vacancies v at a cost of c(v) per unit of time, where c(·) is strictly increasing and
convex. Reflecting search frictions, the offer arrival rate and the vacancy filling rate are exogenous to
workers and firms but are determined in equilibrium. A job separation occurs if a worker quits or is laid
off. Firing a worker is assumed to be costless.
There is a continuum of infinitely lived identical workers, with a mass normalized to one, that supply
labor to intermediate product firms. Individuals derive utility from consuming the aggregate good and
incur disutility from working. Worker’s utility function is assumed to be separable in aggregate good
consumption and work hours:7
ω(y, h) = y− g(h),
where y is the amount of the aggregate good consumed, h is the number of hours the individual is work-
ing, and g(·) is a strictly increasing convex function which takes the following form:
g(h) = χhξ , ξ > 1, χ > 0.
7Linear utility in consumption implies risk neutrality; therefore, there is no savings motive in the worker’s decisions.
10
Worker’s consumption equals to the real wage, w, when employed and equals to b when unemployed.
Here, b can be viewed as unemployment insurance benefits that are indexed by the aggregate price level,
or as the value of home production of the aggregate good less utility costs arising from producing it.
The work hours and compensation are determined through a bargaining process. Finally, workers search
while employed and unemployed.
3.2 Intra-firm wage bargaining
Hours of work and compensation are defined through a bargaining process between the firm and its
employees. Given search frictions in the market, it takes time to replace workers and therefore employ-
ment is considered to be predetermined at the bargaining stage. Although the production technology
is linear in the number of workers, the fact that each firm faces downward-sloping demand leads to
a decreasing marginal revenue product. This setup provides a natural environment for an individual
bargaining framework within multi-worker firms proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), in which firms
engage in pairwise negotiations with their workers.8
The key assumption of Stole and Zwiebel’s bargaining setup is that firms and their employees cannot
commit to long-term employment and wage contracts; therefore, when a worker joins or leaves the firm,
wages are renegotiated individually with all workers. Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), I assume that
the threat point in bargaining is to delay and not to terminate the employment relationship. Then, the
firm’s outside option is not to remain idle, but rather producing with one worker less; while the worker’s
outside option is the value of home production b during any negotiation delay.9
The bargaining process can be presented in two stages: firstly, the firm chooses an hours schedule
that maximizes joint per-period surplus from production, and secondly, the firm and its workers bargain
over wages taken the hours schedule as given. Appendix B.1 shows that the solution to this bargaining
problem is equivalent to one, in which there is simultaneous bargaining over wages and hours. This result
is intuitive - the optimal hours schedule maximizes the total pie, while wages are used to split it.
Firms face a downward-sloping demand curve and their revenues from selling x units of good are
equal to p(x)x, where x = qhn. The firm chooses a work hours schedule that maximizes total surplus for
a given number of workers n and productivity level q, i.e.
max
h≥0
{p(qhn)qhn− g(h)n} .
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal number of hours satisfies the following first order condition:
(
p′(qhn)qhn+ p(qhn)
)
q = g′(h). (3)
8See also Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), and Ebell and Haefke (2003) for a similar wage bargaining setup, in which
firms and their employees bargain over the total match surplus. The paper of Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2008) further extends
the original Stole and Zwiebel’s problem to account for the case when workers differ in their bargaining power parameter.
9Shimer (2006) shows that in a model with on-the-job search the Nash bargaining solution over the value of the match is inap-
propriate because the set of feasible payoffs is non-convex. The no commitment assumption allows me to significancy simplify the
bargaining problem and avoid non-convexities of the payoff set as the firm is bargaining with its workers over the current output.
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Then, given the optimal hours schedule h∗(q, n), a wage contract solves the following problem:10
max
w(q,n)
(
∂pi(q, n)
∂n
)1−β (
w(q, n)− g(h∗(q, n))− b
)β
= (4)
= max
w(q,n)
(
∂R(q, n)
∂n
− ∂w(q, n)
∂n
n− w(q, n)
)1−β (
w(q, n)− g(h∗(q, n))− b
)β
,
subject to the participation constraints for both parties in the sense that the continuation value is no less
than that of searching for a new partner. Here, β is the bargaining power of workers, and R(q, n) is the
firm’s revenue given the optimal hours schedule.
Solving for the first order condition of equation (4) leads to a first-order linear differential equation in
wages:
w(q, n) = β
∂R(q, n)
∂n
+ (1− β)
(
g
(
h∗(q, n)
)
+ b
)
− β∂w(q, n)
∂n
n, (5)
which implies the following equation for the real wage function (see Appendix B.2 for a solution method):
w(q, n) = n−
1
β
∫ n
0
z
1−β
β
(
∂R(q, z)
∂z
+
1− β
β
g
(
h∗(q, z)
))
dz+ (1− β)b. (6)
From equation (5) it follows that a wage that the worker gets net of disutility of working is lower than her
contribution to the total surplus.
If workers and firms bargain over the value of a match then separations are bilaterally efficient. Here,
given that bargaining takes place over current output, this is not necessarily true. The firm may choose to
fire workers even if the value of employment to a worker is higher than the value of unemployment, and
vice versa, the worker may quit even if the firm’s value of employing that worker is positive. The implicit
assumption of this bargaining process is that if the participation constraint binds for one party then the
match is dissolved.
Finally, I assume that firms commit not to match outside offers may an employee receive one.11 Even
though the firm might have an incentive to renegotiate wages in the case of its workers getting a compet-
ing offer, there are several reasons for not doing so. In this framework, responding to outside offers will
generate a wage dispersion within the firm across otherwise identical workers. This might be perceived
as unfair by workers and lead to a lower performance.12 Moreover, intra-firm wage dispersion among
observationally similar workers violates non-discrimination regulations that employers are subject to in
many countries. In addition, there are also theoretical models that suggest that offer matching encour-
ages inefficient rent seeking search effort, hence an employer might choose to commit to no-matching
policy (see Mortensen (1978) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004)). Therefore, I assume in this paper that
10Here, the number of workers is assumed to be continuous merely for convenience. It allows me to obtain a closed-form solution
for the wage function. While it simplifies the exposition, this is not a crucial assumption. This bargaining problem can be solved
for a discrete number of workers in the form of a difference equation, as it was originally done in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). The
optimal number of hours is still determined by equation (3) and the wage function has the same qualitative properties. Simulating
the model with a discrete n in the wage determination problem produces very similar results but requires recalibrating some of the
model’s parameters, most noticeably it leads to a lower value of b.
11See Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) for an example of wage bargaining with matching of workers’ outside offers in a one
worker per firm environment.
12Fehr, Goette and Zehnder (2008) survey laboratory and field experimental evidence on the role of fairness concerns in established
labor market relationships. They show that workers decrease their effort level if they are treated in ways that are perceived to be
unfair.
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if a worker gets an offer that yields a higher value of employment under the current wage bargaining
scheme, she takes the offer and leaves her current employer.
Appendix B.3 provides explicit solutions for the wage, worker’s utility and profit functions. The re-
sulting wage function w(q, n) as defined in equation (B9), and similarly the utility function ω(q, n) given
by equation (B11), is increasing in productivity q and decreasing in the number of workers n. Equation
(B10) shows that the profit function pi(q, n) is increasing in productivity q and is bounded from above by
pi(q, n∗(q)) = pi(q), where n∗(q) is the level of employment that maximizes the firm’s profits for a given
level of productivity q. In Stole and Zwiebel’s original problem, n∗ is the optimal number of workers that
the firm would employ. This employment level is inefficient since the firm has an incentive to hire ad-
ditional workers to decrease their bargaining power down to the point where the marginal profit is zero
and workers are paid their reservation wage. However, Mortensen (2010) shows that in a model with
on-the-job search the presence of tougher competition among firms counterbalances the incentive to over
employ and leads to lower employment overall.
Returning to the motivation for this exercise, consider the trade-off between the number of workers
and the number of hours that the firm faces. The driving force in this model is idiosyncratic shocks to
firm’s productivity q.13 The hours schedule, as defined in equation (B7), guarantees that a positive shock
to productivity q produces an increase in the average hours if there is no (or little) change in employment.
As the number of workers starts growing, average hours decline. Hence, the model can capture the
negative relationship between hours and employment growth observed in the data if the response of
employment to shocks is slow enough. The employment decisions of firms and workers are discussed in
detail in the following two subsections.
3.3 Worker’s decision problem
In this subsection, I describe the worker’s problem taking as given all equilibrium objects that are
outside of the worker’s control, such as labor market tightness and the distribution of offers across firm
types, as well as employment decisions of firms. Although the value of unemployment and the value of
working at a firm with productivity q and employment n depend on the aggregate variables, they are not
listed as arguments for notational simplicity.
When unemployed, the worker obtains consumption flow b by means of home production, and she
has an option of finding a job. Hence, the value of unemployment expressed in terms of final output, U,
solves the continuous time Bellman equation:
rU = b+ λ(θ)
∫
(max{W,U} −U)dF(W), (7)
where r is the common firms’ and workers’ discount rate; λ(θ) is the job arrival rate, and θ is market
tightness; F(W) is the cumulative distribution function of job vacancies posted by firms that provide
13Note that I refer to a shock to q as a productivity shock. However, it can be thought of as a firm-specific demand shock or,
more generally, as a profitability shock. For instance, consider an alternative specification where the aggregate demand function is
defined as
Y =
[∫ K
0
α(j)x(j)
ρ−1
ρ dj
] ρ
ρ−1
,
where α(j) is a firm-specific demand shock, and production technology for the intermediate good is x = hn. This specification is
equivalent to the current formulation of the production side of the market with q = α
ρ
ρ−1 .
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workers with the value of employment of at most W.
The job arrival rate λ is derived from a matching function that is assumed to be increasing, concave,
and homogenous of degree one in both arguments, vacancies and job seekers.14 Given the matching func-
tion properties, λ(θ) is increasing and concave in market tightness θ, which is the ratio of the aggregate
number of vacancies posted to individuals searching for a job, the variable that is determined endoge-
nously in equilibrium.
The value of employment at a firm with n workers and productivity q, Wn(q), satisfies the following
Bellman equation:
rWn(q) = (8)
=

ωn(q) + (δ+ s0)(U −Wn(q)) + λ(θ)κ
∫
(max{W ′,Wn(q)} −Wn(q))dF(W ′)
+Hn(q)(max{Wn+1(q),U} −Wn(q)) + sn(q)(n− 1)(max{Wn−1(q),U} −Wn(q))
+µ
q∫
q
 1[ fn(q′) > 0]
(
fn(q′)U + (1− fn(q′))max
{
U,WnF(q′)(q
′)
})
+1[ fn(q′) = 0]max{U,Wn(q′)} −Wn(q)
 φ(q′)dq′

,
where ωn(q) is the utility flow expressed in terms of final output as defined in equation (B11). The worker
becomes unemployed at constant Poisson rate δ+ s0, where s0 represents the exogenous component of the
quit rate and δ refers to the destruction shock. The worker receives an alternative job offer at rate λ(θ)κ,
where κ ≥ 0 represents search intensity when employed relative to search intensity when unemployed (if
κ = 1 then workers search with the same intensity regardless of their employment status; κ = 0 implies no
on-the-job search). Hence, the next term on the right-hand side of equation (8) is attributed to the option
value of moving to a better employment position.
The following two terms are related to the expected change in the value of employment when the firm
adjusts its labor force. In particular, at rate Hn(q) the firm hires another worker, and at rate sn(q)(n− 1)
one of the other (n − 1) workers separates from the firm. These rates are determined endogenously in
equilibrium and are defined in the firm’s problem below.
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (8) embodies the expected change in the value at-
tributable to a shock to the firm’s productivity q that arrives at rate µ. A new productivity is drawn from
distribution Φ(·), with a corresponding density φ(·). Recall that separations are not necessarily mutually
efficient; therefore, the value function accounts for a possibility that, when hit by a productivity shock,
the firm may find it optimal to fire workers. Denote by nF(q) the maximum labor force size that the firm
is willing to employ given its current productivity level q. Then the firing probability fn(q) is equal to
n−nF(q)
n if the firm’s labor force exceeds its maximum size, i.e. n > n
F(q), and equal to zero otherwise.
Proposition 1. A unique continuous solution for the value of employment at a firm with n workers
and productivity level q, Wn(q), and for the value of unemployment, U, exists.
Proof: Wn(q) and U represent a fixed point of the contracting mapping T[Wn(q),U] defined by equa-
tions (7) and (8). Given that ωn(q) is positive and bounded from above by ω1(q), T maps the set of
non-negative, continuous, and bounded from above functions into itself. Given this set is compact under
the sup norm, one can apply Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to show that T is a contraction mapping
14See Pissarides (2000) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for details on the concept of a matching function.
14
(see Stokey and Lucas (1989)). The mapping is monotone; furthermore, T discounts, i.e.
T
 Wn(q) + z
U + z
 = T
 Wn(q)
U
+
 δ+s0+λ(θ)κ+Hn(q)+sn(q)(n−1)+µr+δ+s0+λ(θ)κ+Hn(q)+sn(q)(n−1)+µ
λ(θ)
r+λ(θ)
 z,
which completes the proof that T is indeed a contraction. Then, by Contraction Mapping Theorem, there
exists a unique continuous solution Wn(q) and U. 
Define nW(q) as the lowest employment level, beyond which worker’s participation constraint binds,
i.e. Wn(q) ≤ U for all n ≥ nW(q). If search on the job is at least as efficient as when unemployed, i.e. κ ≥ 1,
then the participation constraint never binds for n ≤ n∗(q), where n∗(q) is employment that maximizes
the firm’s per-period profits. To see it, subtract equation (7) from equation (8) to get
Wn(q)−U =

ωn(q)− b+ λ(θ)
∫
(κmax{W ′ −U,Wn(q)−U} −max {W ′ −U, 0})dF(W ′)
+Hn(q)max{Wn+1(q)−U, 0}+ sn(q)(n− 1)max{Wn−1(q)−U, 0}
+µ
q∫
q
(
1[n > nF(q′)] n
F(q′)
n max{WnF(q′)(q′)−U, 0}+
1[n ≤ nF(q′)]max{Wn(q′)−U, 0}
)
φ(q′)dq′

r+ δ+ s0 + λ(θ)κ + Hn(q) + sn(q)(n− 1) + µ
which is nonnegative for all ωn(q) ≥ b due to the option value of the firm getting a positive productivity
shock and/or adjusting its labor force. This result implies that, as long as the worker’s utility is higher
than or equal to b, she will never quit to unemployment. However, for all n > n∗(q), as well as for other
n when κ < 1, I need to verify that worker’s participation constraint Wn(q)−U ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Note that the value of working at a given firm is not necessarily monotone in the firm’s workforce, even
though wages and utility are monotonically decreasing in employment for a given value of productivity.
The intuition for this result resides in the difference between the effect that a rise in the number of workers
has on current versus future wages. An increase in employment unambiguously lowers current wages.
On the other hand, it raises the prospects that some of the existing workers separate from the firm and
that fewer workers are hired in the future, thus lowering the probability of a further decrease in wages.
Therefore, contrary to the standard search theory, this model can potentially generate job-to-job transitions
that are associated with wage cuts since a change in the value of employment may still be positive even if
a change in wages is not. This prediction of the model is similar in spirit to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
- based on a different wage-setting mechanism, they show that a worker is willing to accept a wage cut to
trade a lower share of the total rent today for a larger share tomorrow.
3.4 Firm’s decision problem
This subsection provides details on employment dynamics within a firm. Firms can adjust their labor
force by recruiting and firing workers. To hire a worker, the firm needs to post vacancies that are then
randomly matched with job seekers. In addition, the employment decision of the firm is affected by the
separation rate at which existing workers quit to unemployment or move to a better job. Both hiring
and separation rates depend on aggregate market tightness, unemployment, and overall distribution of
vacancies and workers across firm types. As before, for notational simplicity the aggregate variables are
omitted from the arguments in firm’s value function, as well as in the hiring and separation rates.
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For the firm’s problem, it is useful to write the hiring and separation rates explicitly. The rate, at which
each worker separates from a firm with productivity q and employment n, is the sum of the exogenous
quit rate into unemployment and the job-to-job transition rate, i.e.
sn(q) = s0 + λ(θ)κ
[
1− F(Wn(q))], (9)
where F
(
Wn(q)
)
is the fraction of vacancies posted by firms that provide workers with the value of em-
ployment of at most Wn(q).
The probability that any offer is acceptable to a randomly contacted worker is
an(q) =

u+(1−u)κG
(
Wn(q)
)
u+(1−u)κ if Wn(q) > U
0 otherwise
(10)
where u is the fraction of unemployed workers, and G
(
Wn(q)
)
is the fraction of employed workers who
gain the value of employment of at most Wn(q). Employed job seekers are weighted by their search
intensity, κ. If the worker’s participation constraint is binding then no worker will accept the firm’s offer.
Then, the hiring rate is equal to Hn(q) = an(q)vn(q)ν(θ), where ν(θ) is the rate, at which vacancies
are matched with workers, and vn(q) is the number of vacancies posted by a firm with n employees
and productivity level q. The rate ν(θ) is exogenous to the firm and is derived in equilibrium from the
matching function.
The value of a firm with productivity q and employment n, Vn(q), expressed in final output terms,
solves the following Bellman equation:
(r+ δ)Vn(q) (11)
= max


pin(q) +max
v≥0
{
an(q)ν(θ)v
(
Vn+1(q)−Vn(q)
)
− c(v)
}
+sn(q)n
(
Vn−1(q)−Vn(q)
)
+ µ
q∫
q
(
Vn(q′)−Vn(q)
)
φ(q′)dq′
 , (r+ δ)Vn−1(q)
 ,
under the assumption that firing a worker is costless and the worker’s participation constraint is satisfied.
If the worker’s participation constraint binds then workers quit randomly until n = nW(q) and Vn(q) =
VnW (q)(q).
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (11) is the firm’s profit flow expressed in final good
terms, as defined in equation (B10). The second term refers to the capital gain that is obtained from the
possibility of hiring an additional worker, given the optimally chosen vacancy posting decision. The third
term is the expected capital loss related to the possibility that any worker quits. The last term accounts
for the expected change in the value of the firm caused by a shock to firm’s productivity q.
Here, the advantage of modeling in continuous time, as opposed to discrete time, becomes evident.
Discrete time models require a careful specification of the timing of events. Given that the hiring and sepa-
ration rates depend on the number of workers, the order in which existing workers quit and new workers
get hired matters for the optimal employment policy of a firm. By building the model in continuous time
I avoid making any (arbitrary) assumption on the timing of events.15
15Furthermore, the timing of profitability shocks and that of employment adjustment matters for replicating the negative correla-
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Proposition 2. Equation (11) has a unique continuous solution, Vn(q), if c(v) is strictly increasing,
convex and c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
Proof: Equation (11) has a unique solution that is a fixed point of the mapping
[TV](q, n) = max
 max
v≥0

pin(q) + an(q)vν(θ)Vn+1(q)− c(v)
+sn(q)nVn−1(q) + µ
q∫
q
Vn(q′)φ(q′)dq′

r+ δ+ an(q)vν(θ) + sn(q)n+ µ
, Vn−1(q)
 . (12)
Given that (i) the profit function is bounded from above by pi(q), (ii) c(v) is strictly increasing and convex
and c(0) = c′(0) = 0, and (iii) firing a worker is costless, T maps the set of non-negative continuous
functions bounded from above by V(q) = pi(q)r+δ+µ +
µ
r+δ+µ
q∫
q
pi(q′)
r+δ φ(q
′)dq′ into itself. As this set is compact
under the sup norm, I need only to confirm that the map satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a
contraction. First, note that T is monotone. Moreover,
T[Vn(q) + z] = T[Vn(q)] +
an(q)vn(q)ν(θ) + sn(q)n+ µ
r+ δ+ an(q)vn(q)ν(θ) + sn(q)n+ µ
z,
where vn(q) = arg max
v≥0
{
an(q)ν(θ)v
(
Vn+1(q) − Vn(q)
)
− c(v)
}
. The map T discounts if vn(q) < ∞, a
condition that holds under the assumption that c(v) is strictly increasing and convex, and the fact that
0 ≤ Vn+1(q)− Vn(q) ≤ V(q) due to boundedness and non-negativity of V function. Hence, T is indeed
a contraction mapping. Therefore by Contraction Mapping Theorem, there exists a unique solution to
equation ( 12). 
Since profit falls without a bound as the firm’s labor force increases, there exists an upper limit on
employment, nF(q), beyond which the firm fires workers. That is, nF(q) is the lowest number of workers,
for which VnF(q)+1(q) = VnF(q)(q). If the worker’s participation constraint is binding and n
W(q) < nF(q)
then the maximum labor force size n(q) is determined by the worker’s problem. Therefore, the maximum
employment is defined as the minimum of the two threshold values, i.e.
n(q) = min
{
nF(q), nW(q)
}
.
Note that n(q) is also the lowest level of employment, for which firms post zero vacancies.
Proposition 3. Vn(q)−Vn−1(q) is strictly positive for all n ≤ n∗(q), that is nF(q) ≥ n∗(q).16
Proof: Note that costless firing implies Vn(q) − Vn−1(q) ≥ 0. To show that the difference is strictly
tion between the growth rates in hours and in the number of workers in the simulation. Intuitively, if a shock arrives in the middle
of a period (as opposed to the beginning of a period) the observed change in hours is smaller because we average the before-shock
and after-shock levels of work hours. Discrete time labor adjustment models implicitly synchronize the timing of a shock with the
change in labor resources. This assumption, however, is not innocuous and tends to generate a more negative relationship between
the extensive and intensive margins of adjustment.
16In the proof of Proposition 3, I implicitly assume that n∗(q) ≤ nW(q). However, the same logic applies if n∗(q) > nW(q), then
Vn(q)−Vn−1(q) > 0 for all n ≤ nW(q).
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positive for n ≤ n∗(q), I apply proof by induction. Differencing equation (11) leads to(
r+ δ+ µ+ an−1(q)ν(θ)vn−1 + sn(q)n
)(
Vn(q)−Vn−1(q)
)
= (13)
= max


pin(q)− pin−1(q) + c(vn−1) +max
v≥0
{
an(q)ν(θ)v
(
Vn+1(q)−Vn(q)
)
− c(v)
}
+sn−1(q)(n− 1)
(
Vn−1(q)−Vn−2(q)
)
+ µ
q∫
q
(
Vn(q′)−Vn−1(q′)
)
φ(q′)dq′
 , 0
 .
First, note that the assertion holds for n = 1; that is, V1(q) − V0(q) > 0 since c(·) is increasing and
c(0) = 0, the benefit from posting vacancies is non-negative, and pi1(q) > 0. Then, under the assumption
that Vn−1(q)−Vn−2(q) > 0, also Vn(q)−Vn−1(q) > 0 given that profit is increasing in n for all n ≤ n∗(q).
That completes the induction proof. 
Proposition 3 shows that, similarly to the original work of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), firms have an
incentive to recruit workers up to the level of employment that maximizes per period profit flow. Con-
trary to their work, however, labor hoarding effect may arise in this model in the sense of n(q) > n∗(q).
Intuitively, in the economy with search frictions, the firm might choose to hire workers above the profit-
maximizing employment level in anticipation of a future positive productivity shock. However, the pres-
ence of on-the-job search makes it increasingly harder for firms to hire workers, as well as to retain their
current employees, when employment increases. In the model simulation the effect of competition seems
to dominate the labor hoarding motive so that the average firm size is far below n∗(q).
3.5 Steady state conditions
3.5.1 Size distribution
Firms are identical ex ante and their type is revealed upon entry. Productivity of potential entrants is
assumed to be distributed according to the same distribution function, Φ(·). Then, under the assumption
that shocks to q are drawn unconditionally from distribution Φ(·), the productivity distribution at entry
is preserved among existing firms. The steady state number of firms conditional on their productivity is
derived by equating market entry and exit
δK(q) = ηφ(q), (14)
where η is the exogenous entry rate, φ(q) is the density of entrants of type q, and δ is the proportion of
existing firms that become obsolete and exit the market.
Denote by Kn(q) the aggregate number of products supplied by the set of firms of type q with employ-
ment n. Then steady state mass of firms conditional on the firm’s type is derived by equating inflows into
and outflows from Kn(q). First, for all n ∈ [1, n(q)− 1] the following relationship must hold:
Hn−1(q)Kn−1(q) + sn+1(q)(n+ 1)Kn+1(q) + φ(q)µ
q∫
q
Kn(q′)dq′ (15)
= Hn(q)Kn(q) + sn(q)nKn(q) + δKn(q) + µKn(q),
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where the first two terms on the left-hand side represent the expected hiring and separation flows; whereas,
the next term is the average proportion of all firms, which are hit by an idiosyncratic shock and which
become q-type firms. The outflow consists of the transition flows of firms with n workers to n + 1 due
to new hires, firms with n workers to n − 1 due to quits, the firm destruction, δKn(q), and a change in
productivity type, µKn(q).
For n = 0, equation (15) includes an additional term that accounts for the entry of new firms of type q,
ηφ(q). Thus, the steady state relationship for n = 0 reads
s1(q)K1(q) + φ(q)µ
q∫
q
K0(q′)dq′ + ηφ(q) (16)
= H0(q)K0(q) + δK0(q) + µK0(q).
FInally, equation (15) has to be modified for n = n(q) to incorporate the possibility of a firm firing
workers in the event of an adverse productivity shock, i.e.
Hn(q)−1(q)Kn(q)−1(q) + φ(q)µ
q∫
q
n(q′)
∑
n=n(q)
Kn(q′)dq′ (17)
= sn(q)(q)n(q)Kn(q)(q) + δKn(q)(q) + µKn(q)(q).
Note that the last equation uses the fact that vn(q)(q) = 0 and Kn(q) = 0 for all n > n(q) since there
are no firms with employment that exceeds n(q). Therefore, Kn(q) = 0 for all n > n(q) serves as the
boundary condition for a second order difference equation, defined in equations (15) - (17).
The steady state distribution of firms of type q is
K(q) =
n(q)
∑
n=0
Kn(q).
3.5.2 Aggregate unemployment, market tightness, and output
The unemployment rate can be derived from the labor market clearing condition, which states that in
equilibrium labor supplied to the market should be equal to total employment across all firms:
1− u =
q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=1
nKn(q)dq. (18)
Aggregate market tightness is defined as the ratio of vacancies to job seekers weighted by their search
intensity, i.e.
θ =
v
u+ (1− u) κ , (19)
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where the total number of vacancies posted by all firms is
v =
q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=0
vn(q)Kn(q)dq. (20)
The matching function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form:
M(v, u+ (1− u)κ) = mvζ(u+ (1− u)κ)1−ζ , (21)
with 0 < ζ < 1 and a scaling parameter m > 0. The parameter m represents the efficiency of a matching
process. The job-finding rate, defined as the ratio of matches to job seekers, can be expressed as a function
of market tightness alone, i.e. λ(θ) = mθζ . Similarly, the worker meeting rate, defined as the ratio of
matches to posted vacancies, can be written as ν(θ) = mθζ−1.
Finally, equilibrium in the goods market is achieved when total output produced by all intermediate
firms is equal to the aggregate demand for the final good, i.e.
Y =
 q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=1
(
qhn(q)n
) ρ−1
ρ
Kn(q)dq

ρ
ρ−1
(22)
=
(
ρ− 1
χξρ
) 1
ξ−1
 q∫
q
q
ξ(ρ−1)
(ξ−1)ρ+1
n(q)
∑
n=1
n
(ξ−1)(ρ−1)
(ξ−1)ρ+1 Kn(q)dq

(ξ−1)ρ+1
(ξ−1)(ρ−1)
.
3.5.3 F and G distribution functions
The job offer distribution F(W) is merely a fraction of aggregate vacancies that are posted by firms,
which provide workers with the value of employment of at most W, i.e.
F(W) =
q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=0
1
[
Wn(q) ≤W
]
vn(q)Kn(q)dq
v
. (23)
Similarly, the steady state distribution of workers, G(W), refers to the fraction of total workforce employed
at jobs, which guarantee workers the value of employment of at most W, i.e.
G(W) =
q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=1
1
[
Wn(q) ≤W
]
nKn(q)dq
q∫
q
n(q)
∑
n=1
nKn(q)dq
. (24)
Combining equations (15) - (17) with the definitions of F(W) and G(W), after some algebraic manip-
ulations leads to a familiar condition for the steady state unemployment rate that equates flows into and
20
out of unemployment. That is, the steady state unemployment rate solves the following equation:
λ(θ)u = (1− u)(δ+ s0 + µl). (25)
The left-hand side of this equation refers to the outflow from unemployment due to finding a job. The
right-hand side includes the inflow into the pool of unemployed workers due to three reasons: the de-
struction shock, the exogenous quit, and the layoff in the event of an adverse productivity shock.17 The
last term is the product of the shock arrival rate, µ, and the average proportion of workers that are laid off
when the firm’s productivity changes, l, which in turn is computed as
l =
q∫
q
q¯∫
q
n(q′)
∑
n=n(q)
(n− n(q))Kn(q′)dq′
q∫
q
n(q′)
∑
n=1
nKn(q′)dq′
φ(q)dq.
3.6 Equilibrium
Definition: A steady state market equilibrium is a set of numbers (θ, u,U,Y), a set of distribution func-
tions
(
G(W), F(W)
)
: R+ → [0, 1], a set of functions defined on a state space
(
Wn(q),Vn(q), vn(q),Kn(q)
)
:
[q, q] × I+ → R+, a set of functions defined on firm productivity types K(q) : [q, q] → R+ and n(q) :
[q, q]→ I+, that satisfy equations (7), (8), (11), (14) - (24).
To find a steady state equilibrium, I look for a fixed point of the mapping where the worker’s and
firm’s problems are solved given aggregate market tightness, unemployment, aggregate demand, and
distribution functions of vacancies and workers across firm types. Then, the aggregate variables and
steady state distributions are updated using the optimal employment decisions of firms. Appendix C.1
provides details on a steady state equilibrium solution algorithm used in the numerical simulation proce-
dure described below.
4 Calibration
The model is simulated under the assumption that the economy is in steady state. I solve for the
type-conditional equilibrium hiring and separation rates, Hn(q) and sn(q), respectively, as well as the
maximum labor force size, n(q). Then, under the assumption of a Poisson arrival rate of firm-specific
shocks, I can simulate firms’ employment histories (further details can be found in Appendix C.2). The
continuous-time nature of the model eliminates the need to make any arbitrary assumptions on the timing
of the events. Worker flows are simulated at a monthly frequency; while hours, wages, and value added
are aggregated into quarterly series to mimic the reporting frequency of the administrative data. Most
importantly, to ensure that the simulated moments are comparable to empirical moments the simulated
hours measure is constructed based on the 9-hour intervals following the pension contribution payment
rule, in parallel with the data.
17Here, the term ‘layoff’ is used loosely since maximum labor force size may be determined by the worker’s problem, i.e. if
n(q) = nW(q) then workers quit.
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In the following subsections, I start by discussing the parameter choice for the simulation and implied
values of adjustment costs. I then present main predictions of the model and compare them with the
Danish firm data.
4.1 Parameter choice
Table 4 presents the pre-determined parameters of the model. The monthly interest rate r is equal to
0.4%, which is equivalent to a yearly interest rate of about 5%. The destruction rate parameter δ is set
to be equal to the average (size-weighted) firm exit rate, which is found to be 0.52% per month over the
period of 1999-2006. Without the data on vacancies, the matching function parameters m and ζ cannot
be identified separately. For the purpose of this simulation, the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to vacancies, ζ, is set to 0.5.
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ρ, determines the degree of decreasing re-
turns to scale of the revenue function. Recall that the revenue function, expressed in final output terms, is
given by
R = Y
1
ρ x
ρ−1
ρ ,
where R is revenues, Y is aggregate demand for the final good, and x is the amount of the intermediate
good produced. The returns to scale parameter is equal to ρ−1ρ . There is a wide range of estimates of the
revenue returns to scale in the literature: for instance, Khan and Thomas (2003) use the estimate of 0.905,
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) report an estimate of 0.592, while Gourio and Kashyap (2007) choose a
calibrated value of 0.6. I set ρ to 2.3, which yields a somewhat lower value of the returns to scale parameter
of 0.56. However, I find that smaller ρ reduces the incentive to hire new workers in the event of a positive
shock by making profits less sensitive to productivity fluctuations, which helps the model to replicate a
negative correlation between hours and employment growth.
Table 4: Pre-determined parameter values
Parameter Value
Monthly interest rate, r 0.4%
Destruction rate, δ 0.52%
Curvature of matching, ζ 0.5
Elasticity of substitution, ρ 2.3
Table 5 presents the remaining parameter values calibrated to match empirical moments. While it is
not possible to associate individual parameters with individual moments, the results of numerical simu-
lation help to identify particular moments that play key roles in identifying structural parameters. Unem-
ployment benefit b, or alternatively the value of home production, is set to match the unemployment rate
of 4.8%, the average unemployment rate during the period of 1999-2006 (OECD Economic Outlook 2007).
The implied replacement ratio, defined as the ratio of unemployment benefit to the average monthly
wage, is about 60%. Worker’s bargaining power parameter, β, affects the amount of rent-sharing in the
model and is set to 0.1 to match the average labor share in value added in the data. This value is consistent
with the estimates reported in Cahuc et al. (2006).
The scale parameter χ on the disutility from working is chosen to reproduce the average weekly work
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hours in the model. The curvature parameter of the utility cost function ξ plays a prominent role for the
hours-employment trade-off through its effect on the cost of varying hours of work. I set ξ = 2.2 that is
within the range of estimates found by Cooper and Willis (2009) and Bloom (2009). This value ensures
that the correlation between hourly wages and hours predicted by the model is close to that observed in
the data. Under this parameterization of the utility cost function, the implied disutility from working one
hour of overtime, i.e. one hour above 37 hours a week, amounts to about 600 DKK per month.
Table 5: Calibrated parameter values
Parameter Value Description
b 10,410 Value of home production, DKK
χ 0.16 Scale parameter, utility cost function, DKK
ξ 2.2 Convexity, utility cost function
β 0.1 Workers’ bargaining power
c0 1,430 Scale parameter, vacancy cost function, DKK
c1 1.4 Convexity, vacancy cost function
κ 0.9 Relative search intensity of employed workers
s0 0.004 Exogenous quit rate
m 0.4 Efficiency of matching
µ 0.04 Shock arrival rate
η 0.00164 Entry rate
For the numerical simulation, I use the following specification of the vacancy posting costs: c(v) =
c0vc1 , with c0 > 0 and c1 > 1. The scale parameter c0 is chosen such that the job-finding rate is equal
to 0.2, which corresponds to mean unemployment duration of 5 months.18 The curvature of the vacancy
cost function, c1, reduces variation in the hiring rate: a more convex cost function means that firms make
smaller and slower adjustments to their workforce. The degree of convexity c1 = 1.4 may seem low
compared to some estimates found in previous studies – for example, Mertz and Yashiv (2007) report that
labor adjustment costs are approximately cubic. However, these values are sensitive to both time and
cross-section aggregation. The observed labor variation patterns look smoother in the aggregate data and
hence produce higher estimates of the costs function convexity.19. Thus, while Mertz and Yashiv (2007)
find that a cubic specification for adjustment costs fits the data well on a quarterly basis, c1 = 1.4 is a
reasonable value for monthly worker flows.
Given a low rate of unemployment yet relatively long unemployment duration in the Danish labor
market, the implied values for the job finding rate λ and the separation rate into unemployment are also
low. Thus, job-to-job transitions are a necessary component that allows the mode to match the observed
magnitudes of hiring and separation rates of about 8 percent per month. The relative search intensity is
set at κ = 0.9 to fit the average monthly separation rate. The exogenous quit rate parameter, s0, is set to
match the standard deviation of the separation rate. The idea behind it is that a larger share of exoge-
18The average distribution of unemployed workers by duration during the period of 1999-2006 was the following: 23.1% of
workers were unemployed for less than one month; 18.4% - for 1 to 3 months; 19.5% - for 3 to 6 months; 17.6% - for 6 to 12 months,
and 21.4% were unemployed for more than a year (OECD Economic Outlook 2007). Median duration is between 3 and 6 months. I
choose mean duration of 5 months to be a reasonable target, which corresponds to the monthly job-finding rate of 0.2.
19This point was first noted by Hamermesh (1989) by demonstrating a stark difference between aggregate and individual em-
ployment adjustment patterns when aggregation was done over just seven plants. Bloom (2009) illustrates how adjustment costs
estimates change depending on time aggregation and within-firm aggregation over different production units
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nous quits in total separations reduces their responsiveness to productivity shocks and hence lowers the
volatility of the separation rate. Also, a higher value of s0 increases the correlation between the separation
rate and employment. Intuitively, under the assumption of an exogenous and constant quit rate, the sep-
aration rate is independent of employment (or positively related since the probability of layoffs rises with
the firm’s workforce). In the data, however, this relationship is slightly negative with the size-weighted
correlation coefficient of -0.03. Thus, bringing in endogenous quits into the model ensures that the corre-
lation coefficient between the separation rate and employment is also negative and equal to -0.04 in the
simulated data.
The underlying productivity is assumed to follow a Generalized Pareto distribution and its parameters
are chosen to fit the size distribution of firms (the following subsection provides a thorough discussion
on that). The arrival rate of productivity shocks, µ, determines the persistence of labor productivity at the
firm level.20 Table 6 summarizes the empirical moments and the corresponding simulated moments that
are used to calibrate the parameters of the model.
Table 6: Data-based versus simulated moments
Statistics Data Model
Unemployment rate, u 0.048 0.048
Job-finding rate, λ 0.200 0.197
Average separation ratea, E(SRt) 0.076 0.075
St. dev. of separation ratea, sd(SRt) 0.152 0.142
St. dev. of hiring ratea, sd(HRt) 0.153 0.130
Employment-hours growth relation, corr(∆ log Nt,∆ log ht) -0.300 -0.232
Average weekly hoursb, E(ht) 33.7 33.8
Wage-hours relationc, corr
(
Wt
Ntht
, ht
)
0.166 0.260
Labor shared, E(Wt/Rt) 0.51 0.55
Productivity autocorrelation, corr
(
Rt−1
Nt−1 ,
Rt
Nt
)
0.698 0.617
Mean employmente, E(Nt) 9.2 8.7
Median employmente, Med(Nt) 4 5.7
Standard deviation of employmente, sd(Nt) 15.4 10.4
Notes: a - Continuing firms only, moments are weighted by employment share. b - Based on annual
hours reported by OECD Economic outlook (2007) over the period of 1999-2006. To get weekly hours,
I divide annual hours by 46 weeks assuming there are 6 weeks of vacation. c - Hourly wages here are
based on the upper bound measure of hours (for more details see Section 4.2.4.); moments are weighted
by employment share. d - Estimated on firms with non-negative profits, i.e. Rt > Wt. e - Top one percent
of firms (with more than 150 employees) are excluded from the sample.
4.2 Labor adjustment costs
In this paper, I focus on labor adjustment costs that are associated with hiring frictions. In general, it is
not easy to obtain information on various sources and sizes of adjustment costs. Recent works of Abowd
and Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2004) estimate employment adjustment costs directly
based on survey data for a representative sample of French firms. They find considerable magnitudes of
20This Poisson arrival shock process is equivalent to a discrete time mean-reverting AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient
of e−µ. Thus, a lower value of µ implies higher persistence of the underlying productivity process.
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both hiring and separation costs, with the latter exceeding the former. Many of these costs, however, are
implicit – such as forgone production when existing workers spend their time to train new hires – and
thus are not reported. On the other hand, imputing adjustment costs indirectly from the firm-level labor
dynamics captures all, including implicit, components of these costs.
The average cost of hiring a worker is computed as the flow cost of sustaining an open vacancy (c0vc1 )
multiplied by expected duration of that vacancy, or the inverse of the hiring rate. Given the vacancy cost
parameters and the implied steady state worker meeting and offer acceptance rates, the average cost of
hiring a new worker is found to be DKK 4,750, which is equivalent to about one week of wages. Other
European labor markets are characterized by a higher degree of employment protection; hence, the es-
timates of adjustment costs found from data sources featuring other European countries in general are
much larger. For instance, Rota (2004), based on annual firm level data from the Italian manufacturing
industry, reports an estimate of fixed adjustment costs of 15 months of labor costs. For the US labor
market, there is no consensus in the literature on the magnitudes of adjustment costs. Similarly to the
results found in this paper, Shimer (2005) calibrates the hiring costs of two weeks of wages.21 However,
Mertz and Yashiv (2007) find that a marginal cost of hiring is roughly equivalent to two quarters of wage
payments - twelve times higher than my estimates. Note, however, that many of these estimates of la-
bor adjustment costs pertain to net employment changes and therefore are likely to be higher than the
estimates based on gross worker flows data.
4.3 Model fit
4.3.1 Employment distribution
A standard search theory typically models single-worker firms, or more generally, it assumes a con-
stant returns to scale production function, and hence does not have a meaningful definition of firm size.
In this paper, under the assumption of diminishing returns to labor, the model produces an endogenous
steady state size distribution, which then can be compared to its empirical counterpart.
In order for the model to be able to generate large firms, while keeping the state space manageable,
I assume that firms act as a collection of product lines and that each product faces its own hiring and
separation process. It is natural to think of large firms as multi-product entities. Lentz and Mortensen
(2008) develop a model, in which the number of product lines for each firm is a result of a costly innovation
process and product destruction. In their model, more productive firms innovate more frequently and in
steady state supply a larger share of product varieties. Here, I assume for simplicity that the distribution
of products across firms is exogenous and independent of the firm’s productivity q. In that case, all steady
state equilibrium conditions hold and one can think of Kn(q) as a mass of products instead of firms. The
number of product lines is drawn randomly for each firm from a Poisson distribution with a mean of two
and is kept constant over the firm’s lifetime.
A well-established fact in the existing literature is that the size distribution of firms is highly skewed
to the right with a very long right tail (see Figure 3). That is, most of the firms in the data are small with a
few firms that have much larger than average workforce. These features of the data put restrictions on the
shape of the firm-specific productivity distribution Φ(·) in the model. I use a highly skewed Generalized
21In his model, the cost of hiring a worker is equal to the flow cost of sustaining an open vacancy (0.213) multiplied by an average
duration of a vacancy (1/1.35 of a quarter), which corresponds to about two weeks of wages.
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Pareto distribution for q with its parameters set to match the observed firm size dispersion and the median
to mean ratio (the exact parameter values can be found in Appendix C.2). The ratio of the entry rate to the
exit rate, η/δ, determines the total mass of products, and through that, the average number of workers
per product line.
Figure 3: Size distribution in the data (solid line) and in the model (dashed line)
Note: Density estimation is based on Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 1. Shaded areas are 90%
pointwise bootstrap confidence intervals (clustered by firm ID). Source: Author’s calculations based on
the Danish firm data, 1999-2006.
Under these assumptions, the model is able to replicate the overall shape of the observed employment
distribution (see Figure 3). The simulated size distribution shows a lower dispersion and a higher median
than the actual distribution; nevertheless, it successfully captures the fact that there is a significant size
dispersion and that the average firm employs about twice as many workers as the median firm.
4.3.2 Hours and employment adjustment
Table 7 compares the summary statistics for employment and hours growth in the data and in the
simulation. The model captures the variation in employment growth very well, but underestimates the
variation in hours growth. This result partly reflects the way in which hours are measured in the data.
Recall that changes in actual hours are registered in the data when at least one worker moves between
the 9-hour intervals. For the variation in labor utilization to be captured in the simulation, all workers
at a given firm have to move to a different 9-hour interval because workers are identical in the model.
Therefore, worker heterogeneity might be one of the reasons for why the variation in hours growth differs
between the data and the model. On top of that, the model predicts that in the absence of search frictions
each firm would hire n∗(q) workers and would employ them for the same number of hours, regardless
of the firm’s productivity level q. That is, h(n∗(q), q) as defined in equation (B7) is independent of q.
Therefore, the variation in hours in the model is driven only by the deviations of employment from its
optimal level.
In the model, the firm responds to a positive shock in profitability by increasing labor utilization and
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Table 7: Hours and employment growth rates in the model and in the data.
Data Model
Std.dev (∆ log Nt) 0.277 0.307
Std.dev (∆ log ht) 0.285 0.121
Corr (∆ log Nt,∆ log ht) -0.300 -0.232
Corr (∆ log Nt,∆ log ht−1) 0.089 0.108
Source: Author’s tabulation from the Danish firm data over the
period of 1999-2006 and the simulated data.
posting more vacancies. Given search frictions in the labor market, it takes time to recruit new workers;
therefore, as vacancies start filling up, hours of work begin to fall. The mechanism is slightly different in
the event of a negative shock. In the aftermath of the shock, the firm reduces work hours of its existing
employees and, if the firm’s productivity falls too low, fires some of its workers. The initial cut in em-
ployment happens immediately; however, the firm now faces a higher attrition rate so that its workforce
continues to decline further down. The average hours per worker, on the contrary, start rising. Hence,
endogenous quits are key in letting the model to capture the trade-off between hours and employment in
the case of a negative profitability shock.
There are a few key parameters that are important for matching the relationship between employment
and hours adjustment. First, a more persistent shock process in terms of a lower arrival rate of profitability
shocks, µ, strengthens the dynamic interaction between hours per worker and the number of workers.
The firm has a stronger incentive to respond to changes in profitability by adjusting its labor force size if
shocks last longer. On the contrary, if shocks are white noise then the firm will be more likely to keep its
workforce at the same level and adjust labor input mostly through the hours margin. I chose the value
of µ to match the quarterly autocorrelation in labor productivity at the firm level. A monthly arrival rate
of 0.04 per product line, together with mean of two products per firm, implies that on average a shock to
firm productivity arrives about once a year.
Second, a higher vacancy cost parameter, c0, induces firms to create fewer vacancies and therefore
slows down the recruiting process. However, it has a countervailing effect of increasing the vacancy
filling rate and thus raising the return on vacancies. Therefore, the effect of higher vacancy posting costs
on the extent of employment adjustment may be non-monotone. In the simulation, I pin down vacancy
posting costs to match the job-finding rate and use the matching efficiency parameter m to essentially
make the hiring process more sluggish. The worker contact rate declines in m for a fixed job-finding rate,
thus lowering the vacancy posting rate of firms.
Table 7 shows that overall the model is successful in reproducing the trade-off between the extensive
and intensive margins of adjustment. The correlation coefficient between hours and workers growth is
-0.232, compared to -0.300 in the data. Changes in hours lead changes in employment: the correlation
coefficient between employment growth and lagged hours growth is 0.108, slightly higher than in the
data.
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4.3.3 Job and worker flows
On-the-job search is a necessary component that enables the model to capture the characteristics of
the data related to worker and job flows. Allowing for workers to search while employed means that
both the quit rate and the offer acceptance rate depend on the firm’s type: more productive firms face
lower attrition rates and are able to attract workers faster than their less productive counterparts. These
features of the model are consistent with empirical evidence reported in earlier studies: Davis, Faberman
and Haltiwanger (2010), for instance, document that the vacancy yield (the number of hires per vacancy)
increases in employment growth.22 The model also predicts that a sizable workforce reduction can be
brought about through quits in the case of an adverse profitability shock. Similarly, Davis et al. (2006)
find that quits account for a bigger portion of separations than layoffs for firms that shrink by less than
12% during the month; furthermore, the quit rate is higher in contracting firms than in growing firms.
Table 8 summarizes the empirical and simulated moments concerning worker and job flows. For these
results, I restrict the sample to continuing firms because the model does not have a rich theory of entry
and exit. The average monthly job and worker flow rates in the data are matched closely by the model.
In line with the data, worker flows are about twice the size of job creation and job destruction. The model
can produce a relatively high churning rate, which means that also in the simulation contracting firms are
still hiring workers, while growing firms lose workers.
Table 8: Monthly job and worker flow rates in the data and in the model.
Data Model
Hires 0.078 0.076
Separations 0.076 0.075
Job Creation 0.040 0.044
Job Destruction 0.038 0.043
Net employment change 0.002 0.001
Churning 0.075 0.064
Note: Empirical moments are size-weighted and refer to continuing firms only. Source: Author’s tabula-
tions from the Danish firm data (1999-2006) and simulated data.
Table 9 shows the relationship between monthly worker flows and net employment adjustment, size-
weighted by employment share. Firms are split into five groups according to their net employment
growth rate. Contracting firms reduce their labor force mostly through separations; while growing firms
increase their employment mostly through hiring. However, even contracting firms are hiring at a 4.5%
rate. These results appear to be qualitatively similar to those found for the US and Dutch labor markets
(see Davis et al. (2006) and Hamermesh, Hassink and van Ours (1996), respectively), but are in contrast
to the behavior of French firms reported by Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz (1999). The latter paper finds
that employment variation in France is made predominantly through the hiring margin; that is, estab-
lishments are changing their labor force primarily by reducing entry and not by varying their separation
rates.
The model captures these employment growth patterns very well. The empirical finding that con-
22Kaas and Kircher (2011) provide an alternative explanation within the competitive search framework. In their model, firms offer
long-term wage contracts and compete to attract workers. Firms that want to hire faster raise the attractiveness of their offers, which
results in a higher probability of hiring and hence a higher vacancy yield.
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Table 9: Average monthly hiring and separation rates, by net employment growth rate.
Data Model
Empl. Empl.
Net Emp. Growth Hires Sep. Net Share, % Hires Sep. Net Share, %
Less than -0.10 0.046 0.496 -0.450 10.1 0.023 0.337 -0.314 12.9
-0.10 to -0.025 0.040 0.093 -0.053 13.7 0.032 0.092 -0.060 13.3
-0.025 to 0.025 0.035 0.035 0.000 50.3 0.037 0.037 0.000 45.0
0.025 to 0.10 0.094 0.040 0.054 14.8 0.092 0.032 0.060 14.7
More than 0.10 0.503 0.044 0.459 11.1 0.273 0.025 0.248 14.1
Note: Data moments are based on all private firms. Both data and simulated moments are weighted by
employment.
tracting firms reduce their labor force mostly through separations, while growing firms increase their em-
ployment mostly through hiring, is consistent with the model’s predictions. Furthermore, in the model
contracting firms still exhibit positive hiring rates, albeit lower than those observed in the data. In gen-
eral, the model performs well matching firms with employment adjustment between -10% and 10%, but
underestimates worker turnover in firms that grow or contract by more than 10%.
In the Danish labor market, about a half of all firms have zero monthly net employment change and
they represent about one fifth of total employment. A common claim in the literature is that non-convex
adjustment costs are necessary to match the large region of inactivity observed in the data (see for instance
Cooper and Willis (2009)). This model is capable of generating a significant share of firms with zero
employment growth with convex adjustment costs: on average, 55% of simulated firms have zero net
monthly employment change and they employ about 40% of total workforce. The reason for that is the
presence of search frictions in the market – although firms post vacancies continuously, they may have
zero hires if these vacancies are not matched with workers.
Earlier studies (see for instance Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005)) have
reported that the separation rate is higher in low-pay jobs. Although in this paper hourly wage per se is
not a sufficient statistics for the separation rate, the model admits a negative association between firm-
level wages and separations: the size-weighted correlation coefficient between the quarterly (cumulative)
separation rate and (upper bound) hourly wages is -0.23 in the model and -0.14 in the data.
4.3.4 Wages and hours
The trade-off between changes in hours and employment comes from two sources: (i) hiring costs that
halt the adjustment in the number of workers and (ii) costs of changing hours of work. If variations in
hours are inexpensive then firms would make all the adjustment on the intensive margin alone. In the
model, it is the convexity of disutility arising from working that generates the increasing marginal cost of
employing the worker for an extra hour. The existing studies support the claim that variations in hours
are expensive in the data. For example, ample empirical evidence for a negative part-time/full-time wage
premium has been documented in the literature (see Blank (1990) for a review). Hence, this subsection
aims to test whether hourly wages are increasing also in the Danish data.
An hourly wage series is constructed as the ratio of total payroll costs paid in a given quarter to the
total number of work hours, where hours are measured at their lower bound as before. This measure of
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wages represents an upper bound on cenactual wages. The correlation between the two series – wages
and work hours – turns out to be slightly negative in the data. One explanation for this counterintuitive
finding is mis-measurement of wages: if wages are overestimated relatively more for low values of hours
then we expect to see a decline in hourly wages as hours rise. For that reason, I construct an alternative
(upper bound) measure of hours per worker that assumes the right boundary of each 9-hour interval
for all employees with positive pension contributions; moreover, it assigns 9 hours to workers with zero
contributions (see Appendix A for more details on how this variable is constructed). The hourly wage
series constructed in this manner represents a lower bound on actual wages. The difference between the
two wage measures is more prominent for low values of hours, mainly due to fact that the latter measure
includes employees that work less than 9 hours.
Figure 4: Non-parametric regression of hourly wages on hours per worker in the data (solid line) and in
the model (dashed line).
Note: Estimates are based on Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5. Shaded area is 90% pointwise
bootstrap confidence interval around upper and lower bound on hourly wage (clustered by firm ID).
Hourly wages less than 80 DKK per hour are removed from the analysis (this figure is regarded as an
estimate of the effective legal minimum wage), as well as the top one percent of the observed wage distri-
bution. Source: Author’s calculations from the Danish firm data, 2006.
Figure 4 displays the relationship between two measures of wages and work hours. The upper bound
on wages displays a marked drop in wages for low values of hours. On the contrary, the lower bound
is undoubtedly increasing in work hours. Hence, the negative association between wages and hours can
be attributed to a large extent to mismeasurement of hours. Most importantly, the model is capable of
reproducing the observed empirical relationship between wages and hours: the upper bound on wages
(constructed in the same way as in the data) is non-monotone for low values of hours; while the lower
bound on wages in increasing for the whole range of hours.
In the data, average wages appear to be increasing in firm size - the finding that has been well-
documented in many other studies (see for instance Oi and Idson (1999)). Despite the fact that Stole-
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Zwiebel bargaining implies that a rise in the workforce pushes wages downwards, the model generates a
positive relationship between wages and employment due to the composition effect. That is, larger firms
tend to be more productive on average and thus offer higher wages.
5 Counterfactual experiments
Given the parameter values above, I use the model to analyze how changes in the adjustment costs
affect employment policies of firms. I simulate an introduction of firing costs and an increase in the va-
cancy posting costs, and quantify their impact on unemployment, the job finding rate, and average work
hours. I compare the effects obtained in a general equilibrium framework to that of partial equilibrium, in
which vacancy-filling rates and quit rates are kept unchanged after the change in costs. Then, I perform
two policy experiments – (i) an introduction of hiring subsidies, and (ii) imposing an upper limit on work
hours – and show their effects on aggregate employment and total welfare. Note that I do not consider
transition dynamics after the changes are introduced, instead these experiments should be thought of as
a comparison between two steady state economies - the baseline versus a counterfactual economy with
alternative parameter values.
5.1 Firing costs
A significant part of labor adjustment costs is related to various forms of labor market regulations,
including dismissal costs. In fact, it is the current consensus in this literature that legal impediments to
firing workers are responsible for the relatively sluggish employment growth and high levels of unem-
ployment in many European countries in recent decades (see for instance Goux et al. (2001) and Kramarz
and Michaud (2004) for empirical studies, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for a theoretical model). That has
led economists to promote labor market reforms aimed at lowering the cost of dismissals, a policy change
that many European countries have considered or implemented. In Denmark, firing costs are considered
to be virtually non-existent; therefore, they are assumed to be absent in the benchmark model (see Ap-
pendix A.1. for details on collective bargaining rules on dismissal costs). As a counterfactual experiment,
I introduce into the model fixed (lump-sum) firing costs to reflect collective dismissals.
Compared to the baseline case, the introduction of firing costs of three months of wages raises unem-
ployment by 2.5 percentage points.23 The effect of firing costs on unemployment is mitigated by the fact
that most of the reduction in the workforce in the model is achieved through quits.24 This result relies on
a fairly high job-finding rate in Denmark, so that workers prefer to leave troubled firms to move to other
businesses or to quit to unemployment. One can imagine that in countries with limited worker mobility,
as well as in economic downturns (as they are associated with lower quit rates - see for instance Nagypal
(2008)), workers will be less willing to quit the firm in the event of a negative shock, thus making firing
constraints binding for employers. Also note that wages in this model provide another margin of adjust-
23Perhaps surprisingly, I find that the job finding rate also rises by 4 percentage points. Even though firms now post fewer vacan-
cies for a given productivity and employment level, the inclusion of firing costs leads to a different size distribution, in particular,
firms tend to be smaller on average. Since the number of vacancies falls with firm size, the aggregate vacancies increase.
24Under the assumption that a match is dissolved if either the worker’s or firm’s participation constraint is binding, the distinction
between layoffs and quits (and, correspondingly, whether the firm is sustaining firing costs) is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, given
the parameter values used in this simulation, maximum employment is determined primarily by the worker’s problem. Therefore,
in the event of an adverse shock workers prefer to leave the firm, making firing costs non-binding for their employer.
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ment, in that they can be costlessly re-negotiated in the event of a shock. In the case of downward wage
rigidity, for example, the effects of dismissal costs on aggregate employment are expected to be higher.
5.2 An increase in the vacancy costs
In order to quantify the effect of hiring costs on aggregate employment, I simulate the model with
a doubled vacancy creation cost parameter; that is, I set c0 to DKK 2,860 vis-a`-vis the benchmark case
of DKK 1,430. The results presented below are relevant for marginal employment subsidies programs
that are aimed at reducing recruiting costs. The first two columns of Table 10 compare the results of this
experiment with the baseline model. Doubling the costs increases the unemployment rate from 4.8% to
about 7.5% and reduces the job-finding rate by about 4 percentage points. The average hours per person
rise compared to the benchmark case; that is, higher hiring costs induce firms to substitute towards the
intensive margin of adjustment.
Table 10: The effect of doubling the vacancy posting costs
Benchmark Doubled vacancy cost
Model General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium
Unemployment rate 4.8% 7.5% 11.1%
Job-finding rate 0.197 0.159 0.168
Average hours per person 33.8 34.5 34.5
Most of the existing models that analyze the impact of labor adjustment costs on firms labor demand
use a partial equilibrium framework (see for instance Bentolila and Bertola (1990)). In a general equilib-
rium search model, an increase in vacancy costs leads to a lower number of of aggregate vacancies in the
market and hence less congestion in the matching process. These effects turn out to be quantitatively very
important. To show this, I perform the above experiment of doubling c0 parameter, while keeping the
quit rates and the vacancy filling rates constant at the same level as in the benchmark model. The results
of this experiment are presented in the last column of Table 10. Eliminating general equilibrium channels
generates a much higher unemployment rate: unemployment rises to 11%. These results demonstrate
how partial equilibrium models of labor demand might significantly overstate the effect of adjustment
costs on the unemployment rate.
Finally, I examine the importance of the hours margin of adjustment when evaluating the impact of
hiring costs on employment. In order to do so, I shut down the intensive margin by setting work hours
of all employees at their average level of 33.7 hours per week. In that case, keeping all other parameters
unchanged, doubling vacancy costs leads to a 65% increase in the unemployment rate compared to a 55%
increase with flexible hours; whereas, the job finding rate falls by about 20% in both cases. Ignoring the
intensive margin of adjustment leads to overestimation of the effects of adjustment costs on aggregate
employment but the difference is small in magnitude, perhaps reflecting the fact that the model produces
insufficient variation in hours.
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5.3 A hiring subsidy
One of the main concerns of policymakers during recessions is to find an effective way to stimulate
job creation. Among proposed solutions is a new jobs tax credit. A recent example of this policy is
the US Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, enacted in March 2010, that provides tax
incentives for businesses that hire previously unemployed workers. To examine the impact of such a
policy, I simulate the model with an employment subsidy received by firms for every new hire (although
without distinguishing whether this hire comes from the pool of employed or unemployed workers). To
finance this policy, I assume that all firms pay a fixed lump-sum tax. Table 11 compares the results of the
experiment with the baseline model. I consider three values of the hiring subsidy: 1500, 2500 and 3500
Danish kroner, which corresponds to roughly 30, 50 and 70 percent of the average hiring costs.
Table 11: The effect of a hiring subsidy
Benchmark Hiring subsidy
Model DKK 1500 DKK 2500 DKK 3500
Unemployment rate, % 4.82 4.58 4.50 4.47
Job-finding rate 0.197 0.204 0.209 0.213
Percentage difference relative to benchmark
total firm value -2.6 -4.3 -6.1
total workers’ welfare 0.0 0.0 0.0
total welfare -0.9 -1.5 -2.1
The introduction of the hiring subsidy reduces the unemployment rate from 4.8 to 4.4-4.5 percent and
increases the job finding rate by about 1 to 2 percentage points. Given the structure of the model, it is
possible to evaluate the impact this policy has on workers’ and firms’ welfare. Let us first consider the
effect on workers’ welfare. An increase in the job-finding rate has a positive effect on workers’ well-being.
However, higher average employment means lower wages for employed workers, as a consequence of
the bargaining process. These two effects seem to cancel each other out and the overall change in workers’
welfare is virtually zero. In terms of the firm’s value, the hiring subsidy decreases the costs of employment
adjustment and thus increases the value of a firm by about 0.2-0.5%. However, the fact that firms have
to pay a tax to finance employment subsidies affects profits negatively. The latter effect prevails and
the average firm’s value falls by 3 to 6 percent. In sum, total welfare drops by 1-2% as a result of the
subsidy. The welfare analysis shows that, even though an employment subsidy is effective in reducing
the unemployment rate, it creates a loss in total welfare.25
5.4 An upper limit on hours
In this subsection, I examine the effect of introducing a shorter workweek on aggregate employment
and welfare. This change in working time regulations is often viewed as a cheaper alternative to a re-
duction in hiring costs. The idea behind this policy is that firms would need to hire more workers to
25Another way of financing this policy, such as a differential tax depending on the firm’s size and productivity, might be more
efficient in terms of overall welfare. For example, one alternative would be to impose a tax on sales. However, it has not been done
here since the tax on sales distorts firms’ hiring decisions, while a lump-sum tax allows to identify the effect of hiring subsidies on
the unemployment rate in a clean way.
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sustain their total labor input as they cannot increase work hours of their employees beyond a certain
level. However, this policy comes at a loss of flexibility in firms’ choices, which in turn lowers their prof-
its and therefore might negatively affect firms’ labor demand. The empirical evidence on the efficacy of
this policy in fostering employment growth, however, is mixed. Crepon and Kramarz (2002), for example,
find that a reduction in the official workweek from 40 to 39 hours in 1982 in France led to employment
losses of 2 to 4 percent. On the other hand, Chemin and Wasmer (2009) show that France’s switch from a
39-hour to a 35-hour workweek in 2000 had no significant impact on employment.
Here, I consider a similar experiment by imposing an upper limit on weekly work hours. Suppose that
firms are allowed to employ their workers for at most hmax hours. In particular, I consider three different
threshold values for hmax: 35, 37, and 39 hours a week. If the maximum hours constraint is binding – i.e.
when the optimal number of hours as determined by equation (B7) exceeds the upper limit – then the
firm sets the work hours of its employees at the maximum and bargain over wages only. In particular, the
wage equation then becomes
w(q, n) = β
ρ− 1
ρ− β
(
Y(qhmax)ρ−1
n
) 1
ρ
+ (1− β)(b+ χhξmax).
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 12. Given the model parameters, the unemployment
rate decreases by about 0.4, 0.5 and 1.2 percentage points if maximum hours are set to 39, 37 and 35 hours,
respectively. The job finding rate gradually increases with a shorter workweek. Recall that work hours
from the bargaining problem are set optimally in order to maximize total per-period surplus; therefore,
restricting the hours choice affects negatively firm profits, which leads to a decrease in the total firm value.
Similarly, if hours constraint is binding wages will be lower than in the benchmark case. However, the
overall effect of this policy on workers’ utility might be positive since imposing an upper limit on hours
reduces disutility arising from working longer hours and hence improves workers’ welfare. Given the
parameters of the model, the overall workers’ welfare increases by 0.1-0.7 percentage points. The total
welfare decreases by less than one percentage point.
Table 12: Introducing an upper limit on work hours.
Benchmark Maximum hours per week
Model hmax = 35 hmax = 37 hmax = 39
Unemployment rate, % 4.8 3.6 4.3 4.4
Job-finding rate 0.197 0.217 0.209 0.202
Percentage difference relative to benchmark
total firm value -2.3 -1.1 -0.4
total workers’ welfare 0.7 0.4 0.1
total welfare -0.3 -0.1 -0.05
Fraction of workers employed for
more than hmax in the baseline model, % 42.0 12.6 5.7
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6 Conclusion
This study is motivated by the observation that firms use variation in work hours of their employees to
adjust their labor demand in response to shocks. In particular, I use a matched employer-employee panel
of Danish firms to document firm-level employment and hours growth patterns. I find that the standard
deviation of quarterly growth rates in the number of workers and hours per worker is about the same.
Moreover, the data exhibit a strong negative relationship between these series, which is consistent with
a hypothesis that hours respond to shocks immediately, while changing the workforce takes time. These
empirical facts call for a model that allows for both intensive and extensive margins of labor adjustment.
In this paper, I build a general equilibrium theory of heterogeneous multi-worker firms that choose
their hiring and firing policies optimally in an economy with search frictions. The driving force of the
model is idiosyncratic profitability shocks that firms can accommodate by varying work hours of their
existing employees and/or adjusting their employment. Wages and hours are determined through a
bargaining process. In addition, allowing for on-the-job search delivers a rich theory of quits that enables
the model to capture most of the features of the data regarding worker flows.
The model is calibrated to assess its fit to the Danish firm data and appears to be successful in capturing
the overall characteristics of the data. The numerical simulation does an outstanding job of reproducing
employment variation at the firm level. It matches closely hiring and separation rates, job creation and
job destruction rates, and the distribution of firms by net employment growth. In addition, the model is
capable of generating the negative correlation between the growth rates of employment and hours per
worker.
In the process of matching the model to the data, I obtain an indirect estimate of the average hiring
costs. I find that to hire a new worker, the firm has to bear a cost in the amount of one week of wages, on
average. This value is low compared to the estimates of the adjustment costs found for other European
countries and it is more similar to the values reported for the US labor market. High magnitude of worker
flows found in the Danish labor market is at the heart of this result. Using the numerical simulation, I
show that doubled vacancy posting costs raise the unemployment rate from 4.8% to 7.5% and reduce the
job-finding rate by about 4 percentage points. The increase in the unemployment rate would be much
higher (up to 11%) in a partial equilibrium framework if the quit rates and vacancy filling rates were to
remain unchanged. I then use the model to simulate two policy experiments – introducing of a hiring
subsidy versus imposing an upper limit on weekly work hours – and estimate their effects on aggregate
employment. I show that introduction of a shorter workweek can lower the unemployment rate and, even
though this policy creates production inefficiencies, the resulting loss in total welfare is quantitatively
small.
While beyond the scope of this paper, there are two obvious directions in which this model can be
extended. The first is introducing aggregate shocks into the model. Intuitively, aggregate shocks will
have different implications for firms’ employment strategies than idiosyncratic shocks do. In the current
setup, in addition to posting more vacancies, the firm finds it easier to retain workers in the event of a
positive shock. If all firms experience an increase in their profitability at the same time, i.e. the shock is
aggregate, the attrition rate will remain unchanged; hence, firms have to post more vacancies to reach
their desired level of employment. Similarly, in the event of a negative shock workers will be less willing
to quit the firm because the value of unemployment is lower in recessions due to a lower job-finding rate.
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That would make firing costs binding for employers. Moreover, extending the model to include aggregate
shocks would allow for evaluation of such policies as Kurzarbeit scheme that was introduced in Germany
and Austria in the latest recession.
The second possible extension of this model is to allow for worker heterogeneity. The model in its
current form does not produce enough variation in hours because the marginal cost of an extra hour is
determined by workers’ disutility function and is the same for all firms. However, empirically workers
have different preferences about the length of their workweek, as well as about its variability. Introducing
differences in workers’ disutility of hours would help the model to fit the data on hours variation.
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Appendix
A. Data
A1. Danish labor market
The Danish labor market is regulated mostly by collective bargaining agreements between trade unions
and employer organizations: about 80% of all employees are unionized.26 Collective agreements regulate
wages and main issues concerning work conditions, such as overtime, paid leave, etc. The recent ten-
dency in the labor market is for the unions to play the role of a coordinating institution, whereas wages
are negotiated at the firm level.27
There is no statutory protection against dismissals, as there is no statutory minimum wage. Collective
agreements’ rules on individual dismissals are particularly flexible, which makes the Danish labor market
one of the least rigid by international standards. 28 Long-term employees receive an average of one
month’s wage compensation upon dismissal. For comparison, a severance pay in Portugal is three months
of wages for short-term employees and up to twenty months for long-term employees; up to four months
of wages in France, up to nine months of wages in Netherlands and up to a year in Spain.29 Regulations
on dismissals may differ across industries. For instance, average notice periods vary from three days in
construction to one month for industrial workers and up to three months for salaried workers depending
on their seniority in the firm. The reason for short notices is that employees in turn have flexibility to
switch jobs: workers are required to notify their employers eight days in advance if they want to quit. In
addition, there has been an increase in the use of temporary contracts and there are no longer limitations
on how often these temporary contracts can be renewed.
Working time has always been one of the primary issues in collective bargaining in Denmark; however,
until the 1980s the total length of the workweek has been a dominant concern. In the mid-1990s the focus
shifted to the variability of working time allowing for additional flexibility of work hours. For instance,
in the manufacturing sector the collective agreement was introduced in 1998 that specified that working
time could vary over a twelve-month period as long as the average weekly hours amounted to 37 hours
a week, provided that an agreement between management and a union representative is reached locally.
Further changes were made in 2004, which stated that specific organization of the working time could be
agreed directly with an individual employee or a group of employees.30
To sum up, the Danish labor market is one of the most flexible in Europe permitting firms to adjust
their workforce under a minimal set of regulations. Lax dismissal rules in combination with a generous
unemployment insurance scheme result in a very mobile labor market. Moreover, recent trends towards
26See Danish Confederation of Trade Unions website (as downloaded on May 20, 2010):
http://lo.dk/Englishversion/About%20LO/TheDanishLabourMarket.aspx
27Source: Danish Flexicurity Model: The Role of the Collective Bargaining System (2005).
28Here, I refer to measures of labor market flexibility developed by Botero, Djankov, Porta, de Silanes
and Shleifer (2004). Their original data have been extended by the World Bank and are available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EmployingWorkers/. Difficulty of firing index, which includes requirements
for grounds for dismissal, dismissal procedures, severance pay and terms of notice, is 0 out of 100 in Denmark compared to, for
instance, 30 in France, 40 in Italy, and an average of 22.6 for OECD countries. Overall rigidity of employment index, which refers to
legal requirements concerning minimum pay, working time, paid holidays, use of part-time and fixed-time contracts, and dismissal
procedures, is reported to be 7 out of 100 for Denmark compared to 26.4 OECD average (as downloaded on May 10, 2010).
29Source:“The flexible labour market needs strong social partners.The European discussion on the Danish Labour Market:
Flexicurity”. Published by the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions on January 2008: http://lo.dk/Englishversion/˜ /me-
dia/LO/English/FinalFexicurity.ashx (as downloaded on May 10, 2010).
30Source: Danish Flexicurity Model: The Role of the Collective Bargaining System (2005).
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decentralization of bargaining allow for more flexibility in determining both wages and working time
because many conditions can now be negotiated at the firm level.
A2. Data sources
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on Danish firm data drawn from administrative records
for the period of 1999-2006. They come from four major sources. First, the detailed information on em-
ployment changes is obtained from a matched employer-employee panel that includes all individuals
that have paid employment in a given month. Monthly employment is constructed as a head count of
all individuals employed in a given firm. Quarterly number of employees is derived as an average of
three months employment for firms that have positive employment in all three months of a given quarter.
The fact that this dataset has time-consistent identifiers for both firms and workers makes it possible to
construct hires and separations series for each firm.
Second, a work hours series is derived from the firms’ mandatory pension contribution data collected
on a quarterly basis. In Denmark, firms are required to pay pension contributions for each 16-66 year
old employee according to her weekly hours of work. The rule for the pension contribution (depicted in
Figure 6) is as follows:
• full amount of contribution (670.95 DKK in 1999-2005 and 731.70 DKK in 2006 per quarter) is paid
for an employee working more than 27 hours a week;
• 2/3 of the full amount is paid for an employee working between 18 and 27 hours a week;
• 1/3 of the full amount is paid for an employee working between 9 and 18 hours a week;
• zero contribution is paid for all employees working less than 9 hours a week.
Figure 5: Mandatory pension contribution scheme
0 hours per week9 18 27
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The available data contain the sum of pension contributions paid by the firm for all of its employees
in a given quarter. Then, a full-time equivalent (FTE) measure reported by the Danish Central Statistical
Office is constructed as the total amount of quarterly pension contributions divided by the payment norm
for a full-time employee (where full-time refers to working more than 27 hours per week). Given propor-
tionality of the schedule, the average hours per worker can be derived by dividing the total FTE measure,
N∗, by the number of employees, N, and multiplying by 27 hours a week, i.e.
HLB = 27
N∗
N
. (LB)
This approach implicitly assumes the left boundary of each 9-hour interval for all employees and therefore
represents the lower bound on the weekly hours of work.
In order to construct the upper bound measure of work hours, I consider the right boundary point
for each of the 9-hour intervals in Figure 6. The right boundary of the upper interval is assumed to be
36 hours a week. This assumption, albeit not very realistic, preserves the proportionality of the hours
schedule. Also, recall that the FTE measure excludes employees that work less than 9 hours per week.
Therefore, if the number of workers in a given firm is higher than the number of full-time employees, I
allocate 9 hours of work to those extra workers. In sum, the upper bound on work hours per employee is
defined as
HUB =
36N∗ + 9(N − N∗)1[N > N∗]
N
. (UB)
One can argue that the firm have an incentive to adjust hours only within (and not between) the 9-hour
intervals in order to minimize its pension contributions. However, the level of pension contributions is
relatively low compared to other labor costs, such as wages, income and social security taxes: a pension
contribution for a full-time employee amounts to about 1% of average wages. It is unlikely that firms
have economically significant incentives to “bunch” workers at the right boundary point of each interval.
To test this hypothesis, I use another dataset that has hours information for each employee, in particular,
the Earnings survey. It contains all firms in the private sector with more than 10 full-time employees,
excluding agriculture and fishery. This survey collects information on paid hours for each employee on
a yearly basis (or for the length of a job spell if it was shorter than a year) and allows me to distinguish
between salaried and pay-rate workers. Average work hours of salaried workers (that comprise about
55% of workers in the data) show little variation: more than 60% of them works about 37 hours a week.
On the other hand, average hours of workers that are paid on the pay-rate basis are distributed across all
levels of hours, as can be seen in Figure 6. The figure below shows no evidence of “bunching”, that would
imply a higher mass of workers at the right boundary points of the pension scheme intervals.
The third dataset is drawn from the VAT statistics for the period of 2002-2006. It provides informa-
tion on purchases and sales of all VAT-liable businesses on a quarterly basis, measured in Danish kroner
(DKK). In Denmark a business enterprise must register for VAT if its annual turnover is expected to ex-
ceed 50,000 DKK. The VAT declaration frequency depends on the annual turnover: firms report monthly
if their annual turnover exceeds 15 million DKK, quarterly if their turnover is between 1 million DKK and
15 million DKK, and semi-annually if it is below 1 million DKK. Hence, the empirical moments on value
added and labor productivity in this paper refer to businesses with annual turnover above 1 million DKK
(in total, 13.9% of firm-quarter observations are excluded due to missing quarterly information). Lastly, I
use only data on firms with positive value added.
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Figure 6: Average weekly hours of work for pay-rate workers
Note: The vertical axis show the fraction of workers in each hours category. Source: Author’s calculations
based on the Danish firm data, 2006.
The fourth dataset contains information on total payroll costs that firms pay in a given quarter. Wages
and output are measured in Danish Kroner (DKK) and are deflated using quarterly CPI with 2001 Q1=100.
The empirical analysis is carried out based on private firms data. The resulting dataset has about 3 million
firm-quarter observations.
B. Wage determination
B.1 Bargaining over an hours schedule
Here, I show that in Stole-Zwiebel’s framework simultaneous bargaining over hours and wages is
equivalent to bargaining over wages given the hours schedule is chosen by the employer to maximize
total surplus. Consider the bargaining problem for an individual i. Her wage and work hours have to
maximize the following equation (note that I have suppressed q in all equations below):
max
wi ,hi

(
R
(
h(n+ ∆n)n+ hi∆n
)− w(n+ ∆n)n− wi∆n− R(h(n)n)+ w(n)n)1−β×((
wi − g(hi)− b
)
∆n
)β
 , (B1)
where h(n) is the average work hours chosen by other workers in the firm with employment n, and w(n)
are wages paid to other employees if total employment is n. The first order condition with respect to wage
wi reads
β
(
R
(
h(n+ ∆n)n+ hi∆n
)− w(n+ ∆n)n− wi∆n− R(h(n)n)+ w(n)n) (B2)
= (1− β)(wi − g(hi)− b)∆n.
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The optimal hours choice of employee i maximizes the problem above, taking the number of hours of
other employees as given. The first order condition with respect to hi is:
R′
(
h(n+ ∆n)n+ hi∆n
)
= g′(hi), (B3)
where R′(·) refers to the derivative of total revenues with respect to total labor input, hn. Equation (B3) is
equivalent to equation (3), given the symmetry of the bargaining problem for all workers.
Next, note that the following limit can be rewritten as
lim
∆n→0
R
(
h(n+ ∆n)n+ hi(n+ ∆n)∆n
)− R(h(n)n)
∆n
=
=
 lim∆n→0
R
(
h(n+∆n)n+hi(n+∆n)∆n
)
−R
(
h(n+∆n)n
)
hi(n+∆n)∆n
hi(n+ ∆n)
+ lim∆n→0
R
(
h(n+∆n)n
)
−R
(
h(n)n
)
h(n+∆n)n−h(n)n lim∆n→0
h(n+∆n)−h(n)
∆n n

= R′
(
h(n)n
) (
h(n) +
∂h(n)
n
n
)
,
again, under the symmetry assumption. Likewise,
lim
∆n→0
w(n+ ∆n)(n+ ∆n)− w(n)n
∆n
= w′(n)n+ w(n).
Dividing equation (B2) by ∆n and taking limits as ∆n→ 0, I obtain the outcome of the bargaining problem
that is identical to equation (4).
B.2 Solution to the bargaining problem
Solving for the first order condition of equation (4) leads to a first-order linear differential equation in
wage
w(n) = βR′(n) + (1− β)
(
g
(
h(n)
)
+ b
)
− βw′(n)n. (B4)
The solution of the homogenous equation w′(n) + w(n)nβ = 0 is equal to
w(n) = An−
1
β , (B5)
where A is a constant of integration of the homogenous equation. Assuming that A is a function of n and
substituting (B5) into (B4) I get
A′(n) = R′(n)n
1−β
β +
1− β
β
(
g
(
h(n)
)
+ b
)
n
1−β
β ,
or, by integration
A(n) =
∫ n
0
z
1−β
β
(
R′(z) + (1− β)
β
g
(
h(z)
))
dz+ (1− β)bn 1β + B,
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where B is a constant of integration.
The last equation implies that the solution to (B4) is
w(n) = n−
1
β
∫ n
0
z
1−β
β
(
R′(z) + (1− β)
β
g
(
h(z)
))
dz+ (1− β)b, (B6)
where to pin down B, I assumed as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) that wage is finite when n → 0 which
implies B = 0.31
B.3 Hours, wages and profits
Here, I derive the optimal hours choice, worker’s wages, and firm’s profit stemming from the bar-
gaining problem above. Given the demand for the firm’s product and the disutility of working function
g(h) = χhξ , the optimal number of hours that solves equation (3) is equal to
h(q, n) =
[(
ρ− 1
χξρ
)ρ
Y
qρ−1
n
] 1
(ξ−1)ρ+1
, (B7)
which is increasing in productivity q and decreasing in the number of employees n.
The firm’s revenue at the optimal number of hours, expressed in units of the aggregate good, reads
R(q, n) =
(
ρ− 1
χξρ
) ρ−1
(ξ−1)ρ+1 (
Yqρ−1
) ξ
(ξ−1)ρ+1 n
(ξ−1)(ρ−1)
(ξ−1)ρ+1 . (B8)
Revenue rises with productivity and with the number of workers if the elasticity of substitution between
any too intermediate goods ρ is higher than one. Hence, the condition ρ > 1 is imposed in this paper.
Using the expressions for the revenue function above, and disutility from working evaluated at the
optimal hours choice (B7), the solution to the bargaining problem defined in equation (6) leads to the
following real wage equation:
w(q, n) = χ
(
1+ β(ξ − 1) (ξ − 1)ρ+ 1
(ξ − 1)ρ+ 1− βξ
) [(
ρ− 1
χξρ
)ρ
Y
qρ−1
n
] ξ
(ξ−1)ρ+1
+ (1− β)b. (B9)
Notice that ∂w(q,n)∂n is negative: as the number of workers per firm increases, the bargained wage declines.
Given the wage curve equation above, the firm’s profit is derived as
pi(q, n) =
(
R(q, n)− w(q, n)n
)
(B10)
= (1− β)
 χ((ξ − 1)ρ+ 1)2
(ρ− 1)((ξ − 1)ρ+ 1− βξ)
((
ρ− 1
χξρ
)ρ
Y
qρ−1
n
) ξ
(ξ−1)ρ+1
− b
 n,
which is increasing in productivity q and is bounded from above.
31Also, I assume as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) that the conditions for the existence of the integral in (B6) are satisfied.
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Finally, the worker’s utility
ω(q, n) =
(
w(q, n)− g(h(q, n))) (B11)
= β(ξ − 1) χ
(
(ξ − 1)ρ+ 1)
(ξ − 1)ρ+ 1− βξ
((
ρ− 1
χξρ
)ρ
Y
qρ−1
n
) ξ
(ξ−1)ρ+1
+ (1− β)b,
is decreasing in employment and increasing in productivity.
C. Simulation
C.1 Solving for an equilibrium
Given the model parameters r, β, ρ, µ, δ, η, χ, ξ, b, s0, m, ζ, κ, c(·), Φ(·), the solution algorithm can
be described as a fixed point search of equilibrium variables (θ, u,Y), and distribution functions F(W)
and G(W) through the mapping, which is defined in equations (7), (8), (11), (14) - (24). I solve for the
equilibrium numerically applying iteration on this mapping. The iteration procedure turned out to be
more stable than looking for a fixed point using minimum distance routines.
Note that the value functions and steady state equilibrium equations can be rewritten in terms of
qˆ = Y
1
ρ−1 q. In this way, I reduce the number of equilibrium variables that I iterate over. Thus, I start with
the distribution of qˆ and solve for an equilibrium. Then I derive the aggregate output as
Y =
(
ρ− 1
χξρ
) ρ−1
(ξ−1)ρ+1 ∫
qˆ
ξ(ρ−1)
(ξ−1)ρ+1
n(qˆ)
∑
n=0
n
(ξ−1)(ρ−1)
(ξ−1)ρ+1 Kn(qˆ)dqˆ,
and recover the underlying productivity q from q = qˆY
1
1−ρ .
I discretize the state space in terms of productivity and use Gaussian (Gauss-Laguerre) quadrature
method to approximate the expected value of any function of qˆ (see Judd (1998) for details). I use ten
nodes for the productivity distribution. Here, I assume that productivity qˆ follows Generalized Pareto
Distribution with the density
1
σ
(
1+ k
qˆ− qˆ
σ
)− 1k−1
,
where k is a shape parameter, σ is a scale parameter, and qˆ is a location parameter. The mean of the
distribution is qˆ+ σ1−k for k < 1 and variance is
σ2
(1−k)2(1−2k) for k < 1/2.
First, I compute the firm’s profit and the worker’s utility from equations (B10) and (B11). Then, given
the initial guess for the distribution functions F(W) and G(W), market tightness θ, and the unemployment
rate u, I construct the separation and offer acceptance rates. I apply the value function iteration procedure
to find the firm’s value Vn(qˆ), the value of employment Wn (qˆ), and the value of unemployment U. Note
that at each step we need to verify that the worker’s and firm’s participation constraints are satisfied.
The optimal vacancy posting rate vn(q) and the maximum labor force size n(q), derived from the
firm’s problem, are then used to find a steady state distribution of products across types, Kn(qˆ). Given
the state space is discretized in the numerical solution algorithm, the equations (15) - (17) represent a
linear programming problem that can be solved for directly. However, due to numerical approximation
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imprecisions, the iteration over the product distribution turned out to perform better. Using equations
(19) - (24), I update the initial guess for distribution functions F(W) and G(W), the unemployment rate
u, and market tightness θ. I then repeat the procedure until the convergence of equilibrium objects is
achieved.
C.2 Simulation
The equilibrium hiring and separation rates, Hn(qˆ) and sn(qˆ), as well as the maximum labor force size
n(q), are the key variables that determine employment dynamics at the firm level. Given Poisson arrival
rates, the waiting time until the next occurrence of any shock is distributed exponentially with parameter
ϑ = µ + δ + Hn(qˆ) + sn(qˆ)n. Thus, I generate a time path for each of the simulated firms as a random
draw from an exponential distribution. Whether it is a destruction shock, a productivity shock, a new
hire, or a separation is decided according to the relative probability of each event.
I simulate 1000 firms for 120 months and discard first 30 months under the assumption that the econ-
omy will converge to a steady state equilibrium within the first 30 periods. The simulated monthly em-
ployment series includes all workers who were employed in a given month. Quarterly employment is
an average of three month employment. The average hours series is constructed according the pension
contribution schedule to copy the lower bound hours measure reported in the data. Wage, revenue, and
hours variables are aggregated over three months to generate the corresponding quarterly series. In the
data, I construct quarterly series of work hours, wages, and value added only for those firms which have
employment in all three months of a quarter to avoid spurious negative correlation between the growth
rates of hours and employment. I apply the same sample selection to the simulation.
To fit the empirical size distribution of firms, in particular, a long right tail of the distribution, I assume
that firms act as a collection of product lines and that each product faces its own hiring and separation
process. The number of products per firm is exogenous and independent of the firm’s productivity level
q. In that case, all steady state equilibrium equations hold, and we can think of Kn(q) as the distribution
of product lines. The number of product lines for each firm is drawn from a Poisson distribution with the
average number of products of two at the start of the simulation and kept constant thereafter.
Firm’s underlying productivity qˆ is drawn from a Generalized Pareto Distribution. To ensure that
the model is able to capture a positive association between wages and employment, the productivity
distribution needs to have a long right tail. The reason for that is that the positive type-composition
effect of larger firms being on average more productive has to offset the negative effect of employment
on wages. Thus, a Pareto distribution is preferred over, for instance, a lognormal distribution. The scale
and shape parameters are set to match the observed dispersion and the mean to median ratio of firm
size. A higher value of the shape parameter, k, means that the size distribution has a longer right tail.32
For a given draw of productivity, to obtain the corresponding hiring and separation rates, I use a linear
interpolation between qˆ nodes.
The destruction rate parameter δ can be identified directly from the exit rate of firms. Monthly exit
32Note that if the following parameters - q, σ, b, c0, and χ - are all increased by the same factor then the resulting equilibrium does
not change. Hence, I need to normalize one of the parameters. I use a Generalized Pareto Distribution with parameters qˆ, σ = 1.25qˆ,
and k = 0.45 for qˆ = Y
1
ρ−1 q as described in Appendix C.1. I then solve for steady state equilibrium aggregate output, Y ,and use
it to recover underlying productivity q. I scale up the above parameters to match average monthly wages in the data. Hence, the
resulting productivity distribution has a mean of DKK 587 and a standard deviation of DKK 1290. For comparison, the hourly wage
rate is between DKK 130 and DKK 207 depending on whether it is computed using the upper or lower bound measure of hours.
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rate is defined as a ratio of exiting businesses to all businesses, where exiting firms are the ones with
positive employment in month t and zero employment in month t+ 1. Under this definition, the average
(employment-weighted) monthly exit rate in the data over the period of 1999-2006 is 0.8%. However,
many (small) firms ‘re-enter’ the market, that is, they have zero workers during one month and then
positive employment the next month. Note that this can also happen in the model: the firm may have
zero employment during one month if all of its workers have separated and positive employment next
month as it hires new workers. Thus, to distinguish between the destruction rate δ and other separations
in the data, I refine the definition of exit as a fraction of firms that exit the labor market and do not re-
appear over the period of 1999-2006. In that case, the monthly exit rate is 0.52%, which is the value for the
destruction rate δ used in the simulation.
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